On Point

State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity

The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.

Yes, you read that headline correctly!  This happened in Ohio.  In case you missed it, here is the ABA Journal’s story.

State v. Andrew J. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 5/23/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Section 973.015 provides that a circuit court “may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence  . . .” SCOW now clarifies that a court must decide expunction at sentencing.  Circuit court practices varied, so this decision clarifies the law and sets the stage for (possibly) a bigger battle over Wisconsin’s expunction statute.

Krysta Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12-2272 (7th Cir. May 9, 2014)

Nine hours after obtaining a § 51.15 emergency detention order, Milwaukee police officers forcibly entered Sutterfield’s home without a warrant, opened a locked container, and seized the handgun and concealed carry licenses that were in the container. Sutterfield filed a civil rights suit against them, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirms in a long (76-page) decision with plenty to digest, even though it declines to resolve some of the constitutional issues raised because they were not preserved or fully argued. The court does conclude the entry was justified because the police reasonably believed Sutterfield was going to harm herself. And the court assumes the search of the closed container and  seizure of the gun were unlawful, but holds the officers are immune from civil liability.

State v. Thaddeus M. Lietz, 2013AP1283-CR, District 3, 5/20/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Leitz’s statements to police were not obtained in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, so the circuit court properly denied his suppression motion.

New Berlin v. John Francis Downey, 2013AP 2352-FT, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

An on-duty police officer had authority to stop Downey outside his jurisdiction because he was acting in response to an “emergency situation,” § 175.40(6)(a), and because he was in fresh pursuit of a law violator, § 175.40(2).

Waukesha County v. Dushyant N. Patel, 2013AP2292, District 2, 5/14/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The result of a blood draw done in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), are admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because police acted in conformity with clear, well-settled Wisconsin law that permitted the blood draw at the time it was done, even if the arresting officer didn’t cite that law in justifying the blood draw.

State v. Andrew K. Wenz, 2013AP2576-CR, District 1, 5/13/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had reasonable suspicion to stop his car because the content of a tip from a known, reliable informant allowed police to ascertain whether they were stopping the correct vehicle.

State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.

State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.