On Point

State v. Shawn N. Hill, 2013AP2549-CR, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A vehicle registered by the State as a “utility terrain vehicle” under § 23.33(1)(ng) is not a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). Thus, a defendant alleged to have operated the vehicle while intoxicated should have been charged under § 23.33(4c), not § 346.63.

Village of Grafton v. Carl J. Schlegel, 2013AP2521, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to ask Schlegel to submit to a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 even though he wasn’t asked to perform field sobriety tests first, and the result of the PBT, along with the rest of the facts, gave police probable cause to arrest Schlegel for OWI.

State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity

This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense.  Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial.  The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.

Robers v. United States, USSC No. 12-9012, 5/5/14, affirming United States v. Robers, 698 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2012); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and case commentary); On Point’s previous coverage.

Where a defendant is ordered to pay restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), the amount of restitution may be reduced by the value of “any part of the property that is returned” to the victim. The Supreme Court holds that a a defendant convicted of fraudulently obtaining a loan does not return part of the property to the defrauded lender when the lender takes title to the collateral securing the loan. Therefore, restitution is not reduced by the fair market value of the collateral at the time the lender took title.

State v. Rogelio Guarnero, 2014 WI App 56, petition for review granted 11/14/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 72; case activity: 2013AP1753-CR; 2013AP1754-CR

Guarnero’s conviction for violating the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was a conviction for a crime “under a statute … relating to controlled substances,” and therefore qualified as a prior offense under the repeat drug offender enhancement provision of § 961.41(3g)(c), because the predicate acts of racketeering involved, among other things, controlled substance offenses.

State v. Brandon D Andre Burnside, 2013AP1293-CR, District 1, 4/29/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Burnside’s position would not have believed that he could stop police questioning and leave. Therefore, the statements he made to the police before they administered Miranda warnings must be suppressed.

Fond du Lac County v. Douglas L. Bethke, 2013AP2297, District 2, 4/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence of particular crime lab errors that happened years before Bethke’s blood sample was analyzed.

Question presented:

Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?

Paroline v. United States, USSC No. 12-8561, 4/23/14, vacating and remanding In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749; Scotusblog page (includes links to the briefs and case commentary)

Resolving a split among federal circuit courts about how to determine restitution in child pornography cases under 18 U.S.C. § 2259, the Supreme Court holds that where a defendant possessed images of a victim who suffered losses from the continuing traffic in the images, but it is impossible to trace a particular amount of the losses to the individual defendant, a court should order restitution “in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that underlies the victim’s general losses.” (Slip op. at 21).

State v. Dean M. Blatterman, 2013AP2107-CR, District 4, 4/24/14 (one-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 46; case activity

You don’t see this very often.  The court of appeals just reversed a circuit court decision denying a motion to suppress evidence of intoxication.  The police performed field sobriety and blood tests after moving the suspect out of the general vicinity of the stop.  This converted the stop into an arrest for which there was no probable cause.