On Point

Robert W. Evans, Jr., v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Justice, 2014 WI App 31, overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31; case activity

A conviction for disorderly conduct under § 947.01 may qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), thus depriving the defendant of the right to possess a firearm.

Evans’s application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon was denied after DOJ concluded his 2002 disorderly conduct conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

United States v. Apel, USSC 12-1038, 2/26/14

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding United States v. Apel, 676 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012).

Federal law makes it a crime to reenter a “military . . . installation” after having been ordered not to do so “by any officer or person in command.” 18 U.S.C. § 1382. A unanimous Court holds that the boundaries of the military installation covered by this prohibition include even a designated area for public protests and an easement for a public road through the installation:

Where a place with a defined boundary is under the administration of a military department,

Wood County Human Services Dep’t v. Melanie M., 2013AP2814, 2013AP2815, & 2013AP2816, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2814; 2013AP2815; 2013AP2816

Foster parent testimony during the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding has the potential to be prejudicial because it creates a risk the jury will reach a verdict by comparing the biological parent to the foster parent;

State v. Keith R. Friederick, 2013AP1609, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Friederick was not seized by officer who approached him on the street and said sought to talk to him, applying United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), along with State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶53, 236 Wis. 

State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity

In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,

Fernandez v. California, USSC 12-7822, 2/25/14, affirming People v. Fernandez, 145 Cal Rptr.3rd 51 (Cal Ct. App. 2012).

Docket here; SCOTUSblog analysis of decision here; Orin Kerr’s “Five Thoughts on Fernandez” here; On Point analysis of cert grant here

Police officers may, without a warrant, search a jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents to the search. 

Kaley v. United States, USSC 12-464, 2/25/14

United States Supreme Court decision, affirming United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court holds that when a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order under 18 U.S.C. § 853(e) freezes assets that are potentially subject to forfeiture but which the defendant needs to retain counsel,

Anthony Ray Hinton v. Alabama, USSC 13-6440, 2/24/14 (per curiam), vacating Hinton v. State, __So. 3d__, 2013WL 598122 (2/15/13).

Docket here.

Trial lawyers, listen up.  Check your expert witness funding cap before settling for an “expert” you know is sub par.

In 1985, managers of 3 different restaurants were robbed and shot—each with two .38 caliber bullets.  The first two managers died. 

Village of Little Chute v. Ronald A. Rosin, 2013AP2536, District 3, 2/25/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rosin argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

Review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity; prior On Point post here.

Issue:

Whether ordering a defendant to open his mouth and reveal his platinum teeth to the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination?

So, this case may boil down to whether forcing the defendant to show his platinum teeth is any different from forcing him to give fingerprints or a blood sample.