On Point

State v. Javier Teniente, 2013AP799-CR, District 4, 1/30/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Teniente was on his boat in the chamber of Madison’s Tenney Locks waiting for the water to rise. Piqued by Teniente’s boisterous behavior, an officer standing on the wall of the lock engaged Teniente in conversation. (¶¶3-4, 15). This interaction wasn’t a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes;

State v. Darryl J. Badzinski, 2014 WI 6, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Badzinski was charged with sexually assaulting his niece, A.R.B., during a family gathering at the home of his parents. (¶¶8-9). A.R.B. testified the assault occurred in a specific room–the basement laundry room. (¶11). But there was also testimony from multiple defense witnesses that it was not possible for the assault to have happened in the laundry room.

Village of Grafton v. Eric L. Seatz, 2014 WI App 23; case activity

“The issue presented is straightforward:  Must a court order the installation of an ignition interlock device when a defendant is convicted of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) and also has a prior conviction for an OWI offense?  The answer is yes.” (¶1).

Seatz was arrested for OWI. His blood alcohol content was .13.

State v. Thomas G. Felski, 2013AP1796-CR, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

For a second time the court of appeals reverses a restitution order and remands the case for the circuit court to explain how it arrived at the restitution figure.

Felski was convicted of performing home improvement services without a contract. In his first appeal, the court of appeals upheld the determination that Felski was liable for restitution,

State v. Ronald Terry, 2013AP1940-CR, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Terry was arrested and detained on a probation hold. (¶¶2, 5). About ten days later he was charged with obstructing and, on the same day, appeared in court for a probable cause and bail hearing. (¶3). He argues the obstructing conviction should be vacated because he wasn’t given a prompt determination of probable cause after being taken into custody as required by County of Riverside v.

Waukesha County v. Michael J.S., 2013AP1983-FT, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Michael has been on a court-ordered commitment for thirty-five years, except for a two-year period that ended in 1996, when Michael was committed under § 51.20 after an incident in which he rode his bicycle erratically on a highway and had a confrontation with police. Since 1996, Michael’s commitment order has been extended numerous times,

Eau Claire County v. Mary S., 2013AP2098, District 3, 1/28/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

Mary S. was placed under a Chapter 51 mental health commitment and involuntary medication order in 2011, and those orders were extended once. But when the County sought to extend the orders again, Mary objected and argued that the County, which bore the burden of proof, failed to establish that Mary was incompetent to refuse medication,

State v. Gary Monroe Scull, 2014 WI App 17, petition for review granted, 5/22/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 22; case activity

Police violated Scull’s Fourth Amendment rights under Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013), when they brought a drug-sniffing dog to the front door of his residence without a warrant or probable cause.

State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity

Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.

State v. Quincy Lashawn Baker, 2013AP242-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Baker was given a resentencing hearing based on inaccurate information about the maximum periods of confinement and supervision for the crime of conviction (felony murder). (¶¶4-5). At the resentencing hearing before a different judge, the state argued Baker’s profane outburst at the conclusion of his original sentencing hearing showed a lack of remorse.