On Point

State v. Quincy Lashawn Baker, 2013AP242-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Baker was given a resentencing hearing based on inaccurate information about the maximum periods of confinement and supervision for the crime of conviction (felony murder). (¶¶4-5). At the resentencing hearing before a different judge, the state argued Baker’s profane outburst at the conclusion of his original sentencing hearing showed a lack of remorse.

State v. Dartanian Lemont Lewis, 2013AP454-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Lewis was a passenger in a car stopped for safety belt violations. During the stop he was frisked, leading to the discovery of cocaine. He argued the frisk was improper because § 347.48(2m)(gm) prohibits police from taking an individual into physical custody solely for failing to wear a safety belt.

County of Milwaukee v. Shear Winston, 2013AP479, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Winston can’t get court costs against the county after his speeding citations were dismissed (¶¶2-5):

¶11      Wisconsin Stat. § 345.53 states: “[i]n traffic regulation actions in all courts, costs may not be taxed against the plaintiff.” The language of the statute is clear:  costs simply are not taxed against plaintiffs in traffic forfeitures.

Marcus Burrage v. United States, USSC 12-7515, 1/27/14, reversing United States v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).

Docket here.  SCOTUSblog analysis here.

The Uniform Controlled Substances Act imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who unlawfully distributes a Schedule I or II drug, when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.”  

State v. Peter T. Heine, 2014 WI App 32; case activity

Heine was charged with reckless homicide for supplying heroin to a young man who died after using the drug. (¶1). Tranchida, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, concluded the victim died of a heroin overdose based both on his findings during the autopsy and on a toxicology report, which was prepared by an outside lab.

“Why the #@$%1 is Justin Bieber’s sentencing exposure so low for underage DUI?”  Click here to find out.  (Please note that On Point did not write the headline!)

Criminal defense lawyers get probation for violating witness sequestration order.  Click here.

LA Times:  CA lawyer disbarred for possessing child pornography.  Click here.

Can lawyers use peremptory strikes to keep gays off juries? 

State v. James Howard, 2013AP190-CR; 1/22/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity

Howard, a former correctional officer, was convicted of 2nd and 3rd degree sexual assault of an inmate at the Milwaukee County Criminal Justice Facility.  On appeal he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) move to suppress buccal swab evidence obtained without a warrant, (2) move to suppress penile swab evidence because the warrant for it was not supported by an affidavit,

State v. Chase M.A. Boruch, 2013AP925-CR, District 3, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

While deliberating on the charge that Boruch killed his mother, the jury asked the judge for the “autopsy report.” (¶¶4, 8). The parties agreed to send back the preliminary and final reports done by Corliss, the state’s pathologist, along with a toxicology report; however, the judge refused Borcuch’s request to send the jury the report of Randall,

Manitowoc County Human Services Dep’t v. Rebecca H, 2013AP421/422; 1/22/14; District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This is an appeal from an order terminating a couple’s parental rights to their daughter.  They claimed their trial lawyer provided ineffective of assistance of counsel by failing to object to the admission of various types of evidence.  The court of appeals quickly disposed of those errors through repeated findings that counsel’s performance was not deficient–which is one of the two requirements for ineffective assistance of counsel per A.S.

Sawyer County v. Maurice J. Corbin, 2013AP650; 1/22/14; District 3 (one-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

 This is an odd little case with some interesting potential. In 2004, Corbine was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a chemical blood test under implied consent law. Supposedly Corbine received a “notice of intent to revoke operating privilege” but failed to request a refusal hearing, so the court entered default judgment revoking his license.