On Point

State v. Adrian Castaneda, 2012AP1596-CR, District 1, 8/13/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Sufficiency of evidence to support felony bail jumping conviction

The state and the defense stipulated to the fact that Castaneda had been charged with a felony and agreed the jury would be told only that Castaneda had committed a “crime.” (¶¶3-4, 7-9). A proposed instruction that defined a “crime”

State v. Anthony M. Teller, Jr., 2013AP502-CR, District 3, 8/13/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The sentencing court exhibited objective bias in the form of the appearance of bias based on its statements at the original sentencing hearing:

¶21      …. The court told Teller he had “bad news” in the form of “a two-year prison sentence coming [his] way,” and, if he came back to court,

State v. William M. Grunwald, 2012AP2531-CR, District 4, 8/8/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Grunwald was charged with reckless endangerment for kicking Stevens, who was lying on the ground after being beaten by Houghton. Grunwald’s defense at trial was that he was mistakenly identified by eyewitnesses to the incident. After his conviction he alleged trial counsel was ineffective in his presentation of the defense,

State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2013 WI App 108, petition for review granted, 2/19/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 123; case activity

Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which a persistent repeater allegation was dismissed, thus apparently reducing his maximum penalty exposure by avoiding a mandatory life sentence without prospect of release. But Dillard was not really subject to the persistent repeater law,

Winnebago County v. Donna H., 2013AP80, District 2, 7/31/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying the supreme court’s recent decision in Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, the court of appeals concludes Winnebago County failed to show Donna H. is not competent to refuse medication. The applicable statute, § 55.14(1)(b), requires the County to show that the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication have been explained to the individual subject to a possible involuntary medication order.

State v. Shipria C., 2013AP637, 2013AP638, & 2013AP639, District 1, 8/6/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP637; 2013AP638; 2013AP639

In a fact-intensive decision, the court of appeals rejects Shipria C.’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove she would not meet the court-ordered conditions for the return of her children within nine months of the fact-finding hearing.

Dane County DHS v. Wesley J., 2013AP1226, District 4, 8/1/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, does not erect a general bar to summary judgment in TPR cases alleging abandonment as the grounds for termination:

¶15      I disagree with Wesley’s assertion that Steven V.

State v. Raylene A. Brinkmeier, 2013AP15-CR, District 4, 8/1/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The police had probable cause under § 343.303 to request Brinkmeier to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT):

¶13     Contrary to Brinkmeier’s argument, the evidence supporting probable cause in this appeal does not differ significantly from the evidence in [County of Jefferson v.

Town of Freedom v. Matthew W. Fellinger, 2013AP614, District 3, 8/6/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Fellinger argues that field sobriety tests are searches under the Fourth Amendment because “[a]n inherent right as a human being is to control and coordinate the actions of [his or her] own body[,]” and, therefore “a fundamental expectation of privacy is implicated when a person is subject to the performance of [field sobriety tests].” (¶12).

Court of Appeals certification, review granted 11/26/13; case activity

Issue certified:

Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(1m) and (2) require that a commitment petition be filed “before the person is released or discharged” and allege that a person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. Does § 980.02 additionally require that the commitment petition be filed before the person is released or discharged from a sentence that was imposed for the same sexually violent offense that is alleged in the petition as the predicate offense,