On Point

State v. Roberta W., 2013AP936, District 1, 9/24/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence that Roberta W. had failed to meet the conditions for the return of two of her other children under a CHIPS order in a different county because that evidence was relevant under La Crosse County Dept. of Human Servs.

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)1. bar evidence of prior consensual sexual activity between a defendant and complainant in a case involving alleged forcible criminal conduct because the consensual conduct is not relevant to a material fact in the case?

Petitions for review are not electronically filed,

City of Stevens Point v. Katrina L. Shurpit, Appeal No. 2013AP538, 9/26/13; (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Shurpit challenged the investigative stop that led to her convictions for operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content and while under the influence of an intoxicant.  A hit-and-run had a occurred in the vicinity a few minutes before her stop.  The dispatcher told the arresting officer that the car involved was gray or green.

State v. Deris Huley, 2013AP682, 9/26/13 (1-judge ineligible for publication); case activity

It’s not often the court of appeals rules against the State.

 Huley pled no contest to a misdemeanor hit and run of an attended vehicle, as a repeater. See §346.74(5)(a).  The State sought restitution in the amount of $4,064.83 for the victim’s personal injuries.  Noting that “restitution is the rule and not the exception” and that “the victim need only show that the defendant’s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury and that [the injury] was the natural consequence of the actions,” the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the denial of restitution. 

State v. Damon R. Lowe, 2012AP555-CR, District 2, 9/18/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Lowe, charged with sexual and physical abuse of V.A.L., his adopted daughter, sought to present evidence that she was motivated to fabricate her allegations because she wanted to get away from her overly strict father, who restricted her use of cell phones, her internet use, and her choice of friends.

State v. George R. Ferrell, Appeal No. 2012AP2602, 9/26/13, (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A state trooper does not need evidence such as odors, admissions or containers to have probable cause to arrest for OWI.  These facts will do the trick:

 ¶12 . . . [T]he State Patrol received several reports that Ferrell was driving erratically and dangerously.  Thiede observed that Ferrell was speeding and watched Ferrell swerve within his lane. 

State v. Greg LaPean, 2012AP2309-CR, District 3, 9/26/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This case boils down to whether LaPean transferred encumbered farm equipment with intent to defraud his lender, Security State Bank, in violation of § 943.84(2)(a); Wis JI-Criminal 1470.  LaPean asserted the real controversy was not tried due to an incomplete instruction on intent, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of intent,

Winnebago County v. Brady E. Bauman, 2013AP1075, District 2, 9/18/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

After encountering a deputy in a parking lot, Bauman stated he had been drinking, had driven a half-hour before, and had pulled into the parking lot because he felt impaired. The deputy asked,  “Are you telling me that you are impaired and you were driving in an impaired state?” Bauman answered “yes.” The deputy had probable cause to arrest Bauman:

¶4        …. 

State v. Glen G. Bowe, 2013AP238-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The lack of any colloquy regarding Bowe’s waiver of his right to counsel when he pled in his prior OWI case does not by itself make the prima facie showing necessary for a collateral attack on the prior conviction because State v. Ernst,

State v. Kenneth B. Burmeister, 2013AP1016-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police lawfully extended a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests because the odor of alcohol, the driver’s initial “deflective answer”  to the question of whether he had been drinking, and his subsequent admission to drinking gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was impaired:

¶11      We reject Burmeister’s assertion that the facts observed by Logan suggest only the presence of alcohol.