On Point

State v. Zachary P. Stuckey, 2013 WI App 98; case activty

The court of appeals concludes that the prohibition in § 948.10 against exposing genitals to a child is a “variable obscenity” statute, and to avoid unconstitutional application it must be read to require proof the defendant knew he was exposing himself to someone under the age of 18. Because the statute does not explicitly include that element,

State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

Witucki, a state crime lab analyst, testified that Richard Deadwiller’s DNA matched a DNA profile derived from semen found on vaginal and cervical swabs collected from two sexual assault victims. (¶¶2, 10). But Witucki did not derive the DNA profile from the semen.

State v. Martin P. O’Brien,  State v. Kathleen M. O’Brien, and State v. Charles E. Butts, 2013 WI App 97.

As briefly noted in a previous post, the Court of Appeals has upheld Wis. Stat. § 970.038, which makes hearsay admissible at preliminary hearings and allows bindover based solely on hearsay. On Point is pleased to present this guest post about the decision by Attorney Marcus Berghahn,

 State v. Tramell Starks,  2013 WI 69, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, case activity. Majority opinion by Justice Gableman, with a dissent by Justice Bradley and joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Crooks

On Point is pleased to present this guest post by Attorney Rob Henak, an expert on Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motions and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

State v. Martin P. O’Brien, State v. Kathleen M. O’Brien, and State v. Charles E. Butts, 2013 WI App 97; consolidated court of appeals decision; case activity: Martin O’Brien; Kathleen O’Brien; Charles Butts.

¶1        The newly enacted Wis. Stat. § 970.038 (2011-12) makes hearsay evidence admissible at a criminal defendant’s preliminary examination and permits the probable cause determination and bindover decision at a preliminary examination to be based “in whole or in part” on hearsay evidence.

State v. Andrew M. Edler, 2013 WI 73, on certification of the court of appeals; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), allows police to reinitiate interrogation of a defendant who invoked his right to counsel if the defendant has been released from custody for at least 14 days. The Wisconsin Supreme Court now adopts the Shatzer rule,

State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2011AP394-CR; case activity; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; concurrences by Justice Crooks (joined by Chief Justice Abrahmason and Justice Bradley), Justice Ziegler, and separately by Chief Justice Abrahamson.

This decision is alarming.  During Alexander’s 1st-degree intentional homicide trial, concerns surfaced about whether, due to possible bias, 2 different jurors should continue serving on the case.  

Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, reversing unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

In an important case for lawyers handling ch. 51 cases, the supreme court concludes there was insufficient evidence to prove a person subject to a commitment order was incompetent to refuse medication. Along the way, the court provides a “detailed interpretation of the statutory language”

Manitowoc County v. Samuel J.H., 2013 WI 68, on certification from court of appeals; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity

Transfer of a person committed under ch. 51 to a more restrictive setting within an inpatient placement, or from outpatient to inpatient placement, is subject to § 51.35(1). The statute recognizes two different bases for transfer: reasonable medical or clinical judgment;

State v. Melton, 2013 WI 65, reversing published court of appeals decision; case activity; opinion by Justice Prosser; concurrence by Justice Ziegler and joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley

Melton pled guilty to 2 felonies, and the court ordered a PSI for sentencing.  Turns out the PSI contained errors (info re uncharged offenses), so the court ordered a 2nd PSI and the destruction of the 1st PSI.