On Point

State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),

State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,

State v. Courtney C. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, on review of published court of appeals decision; case activity; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack

Beamon was tried for fleeing an officer under § 346.04(3), which requires proof that the person knowingly fled or attempted to elude an officer in one of three ways:  1) by willful or wanton disregard of a visible or audible signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police officer or other vehicles or pedestrians; 

State v. Ervin Thomas, 2013 WI App 78; case activity

The trial court properly calculated the 180-day speedy trial time limit from the prosecutor’s actual receipt of Thomas’s demand for disposition, and not from the receipt of the demand three days earlier by the county courthouse’s “Information Management Services Distribution” [sic] office. Under § 976.05(3)(a) and State v. Whittemore,

Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.

Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often.  In this case, it did.   A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,

Now that Wisconsin follows Daubert, perhaps you can challenge the cell tower tracking evidence the State plans to present in your case as “junk science.”  Click here for an ABA Journal story about how to do it.  According to defense expert Michael Cherry:  “No one who understands the relevant science would ever claim that data from a single cell tower can reliably be used to specify the location of a caller at the time a particular call is made.”  Click here for the decision and order denying the admission of cell tower tracking evidence in U.S.

McQuiggin v. Floyd Perkins, USSC No. 12-126, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2012)

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518 (2006), the Court held that a convincing showing of “actual innocence” enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims.

Carlos Trevino v. Thaler, USSC No. 11-10189, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding 449 Fed. Appx. 145 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2011)

Last term in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), a case arising out of Arizona, the Court held that where a state’s rules of appellate procedure allowed a state prisoner to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only on collateral review,

Question presented:

Whether the offense of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2, requires proof of (i) intentional facilitation or encouragement of the use of the firearm, as held by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, or (ii) simple knowledge that the principal used a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the defendant also participated,

State v. Vicente Paul Vento, 2012AP1763-CR, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Invoking its discretionary reversal power, the court of appeals holds Vento is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and based its verdict on speculative testimony from an expert:

¶28      We agree with Vento that there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result because he met his burden under Wis.