On Point

McQuiggin v. Floyd Perkins, USSC No. 12-126, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2012)

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518 (2006), the Court held that a convincing showing of “actual innocence” enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims.

Carlos Trevino v. Thaler, USSC No. 11-10189, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding 449 Fed. Appx. 145 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2011)

Last term in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), a case arising out of Arizona, the Court held that where a state’s rules of appellate procedure allowed a state prisoner to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only on collateral review,

Question presented:

Whether the offense of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2, requires proof of (i) intentional facilitation or encouragement of the use of the firearm, as held by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, or (ii) simple knowledge that the principal used a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the defendant also participated,

State v. Vicente Paul Vento, 2012AP1763-CR, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Invoking its discretionary reversal power, the court of appeals holds Vento is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and based its verdict on speculative testimony from an expert:

¶28      We agree with Vento that there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result because he met his burden under Wis.

Winnebago County v. Gina A.R., 2013AP226, District 2, 5/22/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activty

The court rejects Gina A.R.’s claim that the evidence at the final hearing was insufficient to show she  is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous, noting that much of her argument discusses facts not in the record and that the undisputed facts supported the commitment order. (¶¶4-6).

State v. Tammy S. Camden, 2012AP1451, District 4, 5/23/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court concluded a driver’s speeding was legally justified after accepting her testimony that she exceeded the speed limit in order to get away from a vehicle following in close proximity and copying her every move. The court of appeals reverses, concluding the defense of legal justification or “necessity”

Langlade County DSS v. Michael P., 2013AP385, 2013AP386, & 2013AP387, District 3, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP385; 2013AP386; 2013AP387

Sufficiency of evidence

Based on the entire record of the fact-finding hearing, the court of appeals concludes there was sufficient evidence that Michael P. failed to assume parental responsibility, despite his testimony tending to show he did assume responsibility:

¶26      …[I]t is clear that Michael did not have a “substantial parental relationship” with his children over the course of their lives. 

State v. Marquese H., 2013AP565, 2013AP566, & 2013AP567, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP565; 2013AP566; 2013AP567

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating Marquese H.’s parental rights because it considered the factors under § 48.426(1). The court rejects Marquese’s specific claim that the circuit court erred because, under § 48.426(1)(c) and Darryl T.-H.

Loren H. Laufman v. North Central Power Co., Inc., 2012AP2116, District 3 (per curiam; not eligible for publication or citation).

Normally, On Point would not trouble its readers with a per curiam decision involving insurance coverage issues.  This one, however, penalizes parties for violations of Wisconsin’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, so appellate lawyers of all stripes should pay attention.  Skipping over the substantive insurance issues,

Question presented:

Proper interpretation of Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006), specifically whether a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously-stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.