On Point

State v. Rodney Washington, 2012AP1015-CR, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Statute of limitations, § 939.74(1) — sufficiency of “John Doe” complaint’s identification of defendant for purposes of tolling statute of limitations

The crimes in this case—sexual assault and robbery—were alleged to have occurred in 1994 and 1995. In 2000, eleven days before the statute of limitations was to run,

State v. Romey J. Hodges, 2012AP1330, District 1, 3/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly denied Hodges’s § 974.06 motion alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, and properly advise  Hodges regarding, a self defense claim. Based on the record Hodges has not shown his actions were reasonable self-defense; it is also clear from the record trial counsel knew the law of self-defense and gave Hodges effective representation.

Question presented:

When a post-indictment, ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to retain counsel of choice, do the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pretrial, adversarial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory of the underlying charges?

Lower court decision: United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2012)

Docket

Scotusblog page

The issue of pretrial orders under the federal property forfeiture statute that freeze a defendant’s assets–and thereby impair (or destroy) the defendant’s ability to hire counsel of choice–obviously makes this case of interest to attorneys retained to defend federal criminal charges.

State v. Royce Markel Wheeler, 2013 WI App 53; case activity

Police went to a duplex in response to domestic abuse complaint from what they believed was the lower unit, with the caller saying she had been assaulted and was bleeding. (¶¶2, 4-6). After officers spent some 20 minutes knocking on the duplex’s common front door and yelling, a woman named Bates opened the door, saying she lived in the upper unit.

State v. Antoine Leshawn Douglas, 2013 WI App 52; case activity

Miranda violation — interrogation by police

After a lawful arrest, but before being given Miranda warnings, Douglas initiated a conversation with the arresting officer in which he stated he wanted “to work” for the police by offering information about some marijuana dealers. After the officer declined that offer there was a “pause,” followed by Douglas changing the subject and volunteering information about a gun;

City of South Milwaukee v. Todd J. Kester, 2013 WI App 50; case activity

Sex offender residency restrictions – constitutionality; ex post facto and double jeopardy

 South Milwaukee’s ordinance prohibiting persons convicted of certain child sex offenses from living within 1,000 feet of a school or other facility frequented by children does not violate the double jeopardy or ex post facto prohibitions of the state or federal constitution:

¶31      Kester fails to offer the “clearest proof”

State v. Bryant A. Preinfalk, 2012AP2060-CR, District 4, 3/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The stop of Preinfalk’s car was lawful because in light of observations made by the officer, the anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion to conclude the car was occupied by persons who had been involved in a fight at the Sidelines Bar:

¶11      It is not disputed that the tip in this case was anonymous.

Grant County v. Daniel A. Vogt, 2012AP1812, District 4, 3/14/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/15/13; case activity

Where police officer pulled up behind parked car without activating his emergency lights, approached the car, rapped on the window, and directed the driver to roll the window down, the driver was seized under State v.

State v. Todd A. Laws, 2012AP1930-CR, District 2, 3/13/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Stop of Laws’s vehicle was lawful because it was based on reasonable suspicion he was driving while intoxicated, contrasting State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634:

¶9        Each case stands on its own unique facts; however, the conduct in this case arguably provided more reason for suspicion than that in Post.  

State v. Erwin D. Beckom, 2012AP159-CR and 2012AP160-CR, District 4, 3/7/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly applied bond posted in one case to a fine imposed in a different case even though the complaint in the case in which the bond was posted was dismissed:

¶9        Beckom interprets the statutory language “the complaint against the defendant has been dismissed … the entire sum deposited shall be returned” in Wis.