On Point

State v. Tony J. Lalicata, 2012 WI App 138 (recommended for publication); case activity

Probation is not an available disposition under § 948.02(1)(b) (child sexual assault). By mandating that “the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence” with a confinement portion of at least 25 years for that offense, § 939.616 forecloses the possibility of probation:

¶14      …  We conclude instead that § 939.616(1r) unambiguously prohibits probation,

La Crosse Co. DHS v. Kristle S., 2012AP2005, District 4, 11/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The parent was given a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the social worker with respect to conditions for the children’s return, in that the trial court permitted extensive questioning on these issues before instructing counsel to pursue a different line of questioning:

¶17      Our review of the record also demonstrates that Kristle had a meaningful opportunity to impeach Simmons’ credibility.

Elliot D. Ray v. Clements, 7th Cir No. 11-3228, 11/19/12

seventh circuit decision, appeal following remand in 592 F.3d 793 (7th Cir 2010) (summarized in prior post)

… (W)e hold that in cases where the pro se prisoner’s post-conviction motion is not received, the petitioner must submit a sworn statement and some evidence to support his claim that he timely delivered the filing to a prison official,

State v. Bradley S. Johnson, Outagamie Co. Circ. Ct. No. 12CM495

circuit court decision; case activity

Panhandling prosecution under § 947.02(4) is dismissed with prejudice because the vagrancy statute is unconstitutional under first amendment analysis: panhandling (“begging”) is a form of protected speech and its criminalization under § 947.02(4) is fatally vague and overbroad. State v. Starks, 51 Wis.2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971) (loitering statute unconstitutional as providing insufficient notice of prohibited conduct,

State v. Calvin L. Brown, 2012 WI 139 (recommended for publication); case activity

A guilty plea colloquy need not include an explanation of ptac liability when the defendant directly committed the crime:

¶13      …  Although the trial court did not explain that, by directly committing the La Quinta robbery, Brown was “concerned” in its commission as defined by the party to a crime statute,

County of Shawano v. Justin R. Buntrock, 2012AP997, District 3, 11/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

A court lacks inherent authority to order an in-state defendant to appear personally at a forfeiture trial, and therefore may not default such a defendant who appears by counsel at trial. City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738,

Outagamie Co. Dept. of HHS v. Alicia H., 2012AP1508, District 3, 11/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Protective placement order upheld, against challenge to proof as to risk of harm (care, incompetence and permanent developmental disability being conceded). Fact-specific analysis won’t be summarized here (¶15). Proof necessary to protective placement recited (¶12), as is standard of review:

¶13      When we review a protective placement order,

on review of certification; case activity

Issue (from Certification) 

Whether our holding in Fond du Lac County v. Elizabeth M.P., 2003 WI App 232, ¶¶26, 28, 267 Wis. 2d 739, 672 N.W.2d 88, that “Wisconsin Stat. § 51.35(1)(e) mandates that a patient transferred to a more restrictive environment receive a hearing within ten days of said transfer,” is contrary to the plain language of the statute.  

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point) 

Whether the county adequately proved that Melanie L. is incompetent to exercise informed consent, in that: the county’s expert testified that she was incapable of applying an understanding “to her advantage” instead of “to … her mental illness … in order to make an informed choice” (§ 51.61(1)(g)4.b.); and she recognizes she is mentally ill and needs medication,

on review of unpublished decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point) 

Whether the municipal court lacks competence to extend the 10-day time deadline for requesting a refusal hearing.

Brefka filed a request for refusal hearing outside the 10-day time limit in § 343.305(9)(a)4. Does a court possess competence to extend that deadline? No dice, according to the court of appeals: “Section 343.305(9)(a)4. specifically mandates that if the request for a hearing is not received within the ten-day period,