On Point

State v. Scott E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); case activity

Adequate Provocation Defense, §§ 939.44(1),  940.01(2)(a) – Test for Admissibility

The “some evidence,” rather than Schmidt’s proposed less stringent “mere relevance,” standard controls admissibility of evidence of adequate provocation that would reduce first- to second-degree intentional homicide:

¶9        When applying the some evidence standard, “the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant’s theory viewed in the most favorable light it will reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.”  [State v.

Question Presented:

The California Burglary Statute Section 459 does not require as an element that a burglar “enter or remain unlawfully in a building”. The Ninth Circuit held that it could determine whether this “missing element” was shown to have been proven by applying the modified categorical approach.

The issues presented are as follows:

1- Whether the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States v.

seventh circuit decision

Sex Offender Registration – Due Process Right to Correct Errors 

Given restrictions on sex offender registrants, more than mere reputational stigma is at stake, and due process therefore requires the implementation of some mechanism for correcting errors in the registry.

That brings us to the heart of the due process claim in this case. Plaintiffs allege that errors in the registry—such as being mislabeled a sexually violent predator—infringe on a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Jury Exposure to Extraneous Information 

Subsequent to trial, Hall discovered that a juror’s son was a fellow inmate of Hall who initially told the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but later indicated that he “and several co-inmates had changed their mind about Hall and thought him guilty.” The (Indiana) state court ruled that this extrinsic information wasn’t prejudicial: the burden to show actual prejudice from exposure to extraneous information is on the defendant and,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Procedural Default Defense: Waiver by State 

Procedural default (here, failure to perfect the appeal in state court, hence failure to exhaust the claim) is an affirmative defense which may be forfeited or waived by the State. The State expressly waived any failure-to-exhaust objection, hence the court proceeds to the merits.

Habeas – PLRA and Right to Access the Courts 

During the course of litigating an otherwise unrelated 42 U.S.C.

State v. Noah L., 2012AP348, District 2, 8/29/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

After finding the proof sufficient to support a delinquency allegation, the trial court nonetheless declined to enter adjudication of delinquency, pending a report and recommendation from the Department of Human Services. The report was prepared, which included information not admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing, and the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent.

court of appeals publication orders, 8/29/12

On Point posts:

2012 WI App 89 State v. Richard Lavon Deadwiller

2012 WI App 90 State v. Terry G. Vollbrecht

2012 WI App 93 State v. Troy L. Cameron

2012 WI App 95 State v. Brandon M. Melton

State v. Robert T., 2012AP1110, District 1, 8/28/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶11      Robert argues that because an adoptive resource was not in place for Anthony at the time of the dispositional hearing, the trial court essentially left Anthony without a family and did not make a finding in Anthony’s best interest.  Effectually, Robert argues that the trial court did not properly consider the factors set forth in Wis.

State v. Eric K. Fredlund, 2012AP742-CR, District 2, 8/22/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

An officer’s observation that a vehicle’s headlights “just appear[ed],” such that the officer couldn’t tell if the vehicle had been traveling down the roadway without lights, supported a traffic stop.

¶6        From the deputy’s observation of Fredlund’s vehicle at around “4 or 4:30 in the morning,” a reasonable officer could reasonably infer that Fredlund was violating the law by driving down the highway without the vehicle’s headlights turned on.  

State v. Paul J. Mayek, 2012AP398-CR, District 3, 8/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶8        Although we have concluded Rasmussen did not seize Mayek until after he approached Mayek’s vehicle, it is impossible to tell from Rasmussen’s testimony precisely when the seizure occurred.  Neither the parties, nor the circuit court, appear to have given serious consideration to the issue.  Rasmussen was not questioned about what took place after he approached Mayek’s vehicle.