On Point

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Right to Counsel – Collateral Attack 

Resendez litigated an unsuccessful pro se challenge to revocation of his state court parole, on the ground that he had completed service of that sentence therefore wasn’t in fact on parole. Forced to litigate the issue on his own, he argues on federal habeas that he was denied his right to counsel.

“[A] criminal defendant enjoys [a] right to counsel through his first appeal of right .

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Confessions – Voluntariness 

Given the deferential nature of habeas review, the state court reasonably determined that a 16-year-old’s confession after 55 hours of interrogation was voluntary:

Particularly in light of the highly deferential standard due to the state court, we have no reason to doubt that it took into account all of the relevant facts, highlighting only those that seemed especially pertinent to the voluntariness of the confession.

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Procedure – Appellate Jurisdiction 

Where a party has filed a timely notice of appeal to a judgment, and the district court subsequently enters an amended judgment nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) conforming language in the original judgment, an amended notice of appeal isn’t necessary to confer appellate jurisdiction:

… The district court’s February 3, 2012 judgment thus had retroactive legal effect back to August 26,

State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1)  requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,

Village of Oregon v. Jeremy Florin, 2011AP1708, District 4, 8/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Suspected of drunk driving, Florin was followed by a police officer to his home, ignored the officer’s command to stop, and went inside via an open garage. The officer entered the still-open garage, knocked on the door to the home, induced Florin outside and eventually arrested him for drunk driving.

Village of Jackson v. John W. Hespe, 2012AP680-FT, District 2, 8/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Unsafe,” but not necessarily “illegal” rate of speed supported traffic stop, State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675, followed:

¶6        Here, Hespe contends that while the court found that his speed was not normal,

State v. Pierre R. Conner, 2012 WI App 105 (recommended for publication); case activity

Interrogations – Miranda-Edwards Rule – Unequivocal Request for Counsel 

The issues on a request-for-counsel challenge to in-custody interrogation are whether the individual  unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and, if so, whether he subsequently reinitiated questioning, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Although the trial court found that Conner’s requests for counsel were equivocal,

State v. Johnnie Austin, 2011AP2953-CR, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Continued detention of Austin, following an indisputably proper stop for illegal parking, was supported by reasonable suspicion:

¶14      This court disagrees; the trial court properly found Officer Tisher’s continued detention of Austin reasonable.  If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes reasonably suspicious of an individual,

State v. Craig R. Moss, 2012AP259-CR, District 3, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Terry stop of Moss’s car supported by reasonable suspicion of involvement in drug activity:

¶10      While patrolling a high crime area in the middle of the night, Steffens observed a vehicle stop briefly in front of a known drug house.  When the vehicle observed Steffens’ squad car,

State v. Yvette A., 2012AP548, District 1, 8/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Parent’s failure to appear at grounds phase of TPR trial, because she was locked in a mental health unit, supported default judgment, where parent had documented history of checking herself into hospitals despite actual need for psychiatric treatment.

¶13      Because entry of default is a particularly harsh sanction,