On Point

State v. Diane C. Parker, 2012AP245-CR, District 4, 7/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

 ¶13      Applying these standards to the facts here, this court agrees with the circuit court that the deputy reasonably suspected Parker of criminal activity.  In particular, this court focuses on the following facts as supporting reasonable suspicion:  Parker’s vehicle pulled into a closed tire repair shop in the middle of the night;

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”  

Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity

Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.

¶3   We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  Thus,

State v. Jon Anthony Soto, 2012 WI 93, on certification; case activity

A guilty plea defendant has a statutory right under § 971.04(1)(g) to be present in court when the plea is accepted and judgment pronounced, but the right may be waived (as distinguished from forfeited), as it was here.

¶2   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held,

State v. Abraham C. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, affirming summary order; case activity

Negrete’s motion to withdraw his 1992 guilty plea, on the ground that he wasn’t personally advised of deportation consequences, § 971.08(2), was denied by the circuit court without a hearing. The court upholds that result:

¶2   In support of his motion, Negrete stated in an affidavit that he “do[es] not recall”

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” 

State v. Harry Thompson, 2012 WI 90, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Section 970.02(1)(a) imposes several mandatory duties at initial appearance: the judge must inform the defendant of the charge, furnish him with a copy of the complaint, and personally inform him of the penalties for any felonies in the charge; and, the complaint must set forth the possible penalties, ¶62. These obligations apply to any offense in the complaint carrying a mandatory minimum sentence, 

seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 783 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind. 2003)

Habeas – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Habeas challenge to counsel’s performance in this capital case is limited to imposition of the death penalty, in three respects, all of which the court rejects.

1) Failure to ask the trial judge to have courtroom spectators stop displaying pictures of the victim is controlled by Casey v.