On Point

State v. Troy L. Cameron, 2012 WI App 93 (recommended for publication); case activity

Prosecutorial Vindictiveness – Neither Presumptive or Actual for Increased Charges Following Rejected Plea Offer 

Cameron failed to establish prosecutorial vindictiveness in the filing of an amended information containing additional charges, after he rejected a plea offer to the original information. State v. Johnson, 2000 WI 12, 232 Wis.

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

Jackson Co. DHS v. Robert H., 2011AP2783, District 4, 7/17/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Both federal and state Indian Child Welfare Acts require that termination of parental rights to an Indian child be supported by testimony of a qualified expert witness “that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child,” 25 U.S.C.

State v. Brandon M. Melton, 2012 WI App 95, WSC review granted 11/14/12(recommended for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity

Under “unique facts,” the circuit court possessed inherent authority to order destruction of a PSI: the PSI contained uncharged offenses irrelevant to sentencing whose inclusion was improper under DOC rules; and, though sealed, it coexisted with a second PSI in the court file:

¶22      The circuit court did not articulate any public policy reasons for rejecting Melton’s request to destroy the entire PSI report,

State v. Diane C. Parker, 2012AP245-CR, District 4, 7/12/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

 ¶13      Applying these standards to the facts here, this court agrees with the circuit court that the deputy reasonably suspected Parker of criminal activity.  In particular, this court focuses on the following facts as supporting reasonable suspicion:  Parker’s vehicle pulled into a closed tire repair shop in the middle of the night;

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. David W. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda-Edwards Rule – Invocation of Counsel, Initiation of Contact by Suspect

Where an in-custody suspect invokes his right to counsel and interrogation immediately ceases, but the suspect himself then initiates a request to continue the interrogation, the police may proceed with questioning if fresh Miranda warnings are given and validly waived. 

State v. Randy L. Martin, 2012 WI 96, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Miranda – “Custodial Interrogation”  

Martin was arrested for disorderly conduct and handcuffed at the scene of an otherwise unrelated incident (¶6, id. n. 6). Search of his car yielded a gun. When an officer asked him, Martin denied ownership. The officer then prepared to arrest Henry, Martin’s companion,

State v. Joseph J. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, on certification; case activity

Probationer’s statement, compelled by rules of his supervision, is covered by derivative as well as use immunity in a criminal prosecution.

¶3   We hold that the statement that Spaeth made to Oshkosh police was derived from the compelled, incriminating, testimonial statement that he made to his probation agent.  Thus,

State v. Jon Anthony Soto, 2012 WI 93, on certification; case activity

A guilty plea defendant has a statutory right under § 971.04(1)(g) to be present in court when the plea is accepted and judgment pronounced, but the right may be waived (as distinguished from forfeited), as it was here.

¶2   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(g) provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to be in the same courtroom as the presiding judge when a plea hearing is held,