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On Point is a judicial analysis blog written by members of the Wisconsin State Public Defenders. It includes cases from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Confrontation – Expert Testimony
Sandy Williams v. Illinois, USSC No. 10-8505, 6/18/12, affirming People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 268
A split Court (4-1-4) upholds against Confrontation objection, admissibility of expert testimony that a DNA profile, produced by a different lab, matched Williams’ profile. Because the rationale favoring admissibility doesn’t earn a clear majority of votes, the opinion should be approached with the following principle in mind,
Sex Offender Registration, § 973.048(1m): “Sexually Motivated” Conduct
State v. Willie H. Jackson, 2012 WI App 76 (recommended for publication); case activity
§ 973.048(1m) (2003-04) authorizes the sentencing court to require sex offender registration under § 301.45 for conviction of enumerated crimes, “if the court determines that the underlying conduct was sexually motivated as defined in s. 980.01(5)” and public protection would be advanced thereby. (“Sexually motivated,” as might be imagined, means that “sexual arousal or gratification”
Probable Cause to Arrest, OWI
Marquette County v. Carl G. Culver, 2011AP1523, District 4, 6/21/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The police had probable cause to arrest Culver, the driver in a one-car accident, given the smell of intoxicants on his breath and his “inconsistent answers” to questions about the accident:
¶13 We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that the facts known to Sergeant McCoy at the time he placed Culver under arrest,
Sentencing, Expungement, § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10): Retroactivity
State v. Nathan J. Meinhardt, 2012 WI App 82 (recommended for publication); case activity
Amendments to § 973.015(1)(a) (2009-10), which expanded the offender’s age-ceiling and the eligible pool of offenses, doesn’t apply retroactively.
¶3 The determinative issue in this case is whether the circuit court has the authority to apply the amended version of Wis. Stat.§ 973.015(1)(a) retroactively to Meinhardt’s case. The question of whether a statute can be applied retroactively is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.
Sentence Modification: Repeal of Positive Adjustment Time not New Factor
State v. Michael D. Carroll, 2012 WI App 83 (recommended for publication); case activity
Repeal of ability to earn “positive adjustment time” wasn’t highly relevant to Carroll’s sentence, therefore didn’t constitute a new factor that could support sentence modification.
¶9 Because 2011 Wis. Act 38 did not become effective until more than a year after Carroll’s sentencing hearing, it is obvious that the sentencing judge could not have known about the repeal at the time of sentencing.
OWI – Refusal Hearing , Untimely Request, Competence of Court to Hear
Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka, 2011AP2888, District 1/2, 6/19/12, WSC review granted 11/14/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity
The municipal court lacks competence to extend the 10-day time deadline for requesting a refusal hearings, given the clear language of §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a). Village of Butler v.
Calvin Smith and John Raynor v. U.S., USSC No. 11-8976, cert granted 6/18/12
Whether withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period negates an element of a conspiracy charge such that, once a defendant meets his burden of production that he did so withdraw, the burden of persuasion rests with the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period — a fundamental due process question that is the subject of a well-developed circuit split.
Habeas Review – Sufficiency of Evidence – Prosecutorial Misconduct
Parker v. David Eugene Matthews, USSC No. 11-845, 6/11/12, reversing 651 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2011)
In this habeas case, the United States Court of Ap- peals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The court’s decision is a textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v.
Lamar Evans v. Michigan, USSC No. 11-1327, cert granted 6/11/12
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial after the trial judge erroneously holds a particular fact to be an element of the offense and then grants a midtrial directed verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove that fact?
Lower court opinion (491 Mich 1, 810 NW2d 535 (2012))
The QP efficiently sets up the issue,
Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion and Corroboration
State v. Joseph C. Miller, 2012 WI 61, affirming summary order; case activity
¶5 We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances police acted reasonably when they conducted an investigatory stop of the vehicle that Miller was driving based on reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot.”[5] We are confident that police had the requisite reasonable suspicion primarily based on the reliability of the final informant and the information provided by him.
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