On Point

Wetzel v. John Lambert, USSC No. 11-38, 2/21/12, vacating and remanding 633 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 2011)

Lambert claimed that state prosecutors withheld exculpatory information: a “police activity sheet” that arguably suggested someone other than, or perhaps in addition to, himself committed the offense (robbery and murder); and that could have been used to impeach the principal state’s witness. The state (Pennsylvania) court deemed the information too ambiguous to show that someone else had committed the robbery,

State v. Sean T. Powell, 2012 WI App 33 (recommended for publication); for Powell: Richard L. Kaiser; case activity

Conviction for CCW, § 941.23, requires proof of a “dangerous weapon,” which is in turn defined under §  939.22(10) to include “any firearm.” The pattern instruction, Wis JI-Criminal 910 embellishes the definition: “A firearm is a weapon that acts by force of gunpowder.” Powell argues that, because the State failed to show that his loaded,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

State v. Anthony J. Wilson, 2011AP1782-CR, District 4, 2/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wilson: Joseph F. Fischer; case activity

A known citizen-informant’s report of a hit-and-run collision he observed, including pointing out the vehicle as it fled the scene, was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion for a stop, notwithstanding an inaccurate detail in the report (the vehicle’s color).

¶24      While not controlling here, 

State v. Sherri A. Wittrock, 2011AP1538-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wittrock: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶7        Where, as here, an officer relies on information provided by dispatch, “reasonable suspicion is assessed by looking at the collective knowledge of police officers.”  See State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5,

State v. Jordan T. Griffith, 2011AP2226-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Griffith: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

¶5        In order for an investigatory stop to be justified by reasonable suspicion, the officer must have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”  State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,

State v. Carl L. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, affirming 2010 WI App 58; for Dowdy: Bryan J. Cahill; Amicus: Dustin Haskell (SPD), Robert Henak (WACDL); case activity

¶4   We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(3)(a) does not grant a circuit court authority to reduce the length of probation.  Rather, the plain language of § 973.09(3)(a) grants a circuit court authority only to “extend probation for a stated period”

State v. Marquis O., 2011AP2642, District 1, 2/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marquis O.: Carl W. Chessir; case activity

Grounds for terminating parental rights upheld, against argument that Bureau of Child Welfare didn’t make reasonable effort to provide services for Marquis O. to meet conditions for child’s return to him.

¶5        The termination of Marquis O.’s parental rights to Mariyana was based on the child’s having,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Knowing Use of False Testimony (“Napue”) 

Due process prohibits knowing prosecutorial use of false testimony, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the prosecutor’s exploitation of Bland’s incorrect testimony on a potentially important point (the date his gun was confiscated) doesn’t support habeas relief on a Napue-type theory.

Napue and Giglio hold that a prosecutor may not offer testimony that the prosecutor knows to be false.

court of appeals certification; for Taylor: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; review granted, 3/15/12

Guilty Pleas – Plea Colloquy 

Certified Issue: 

Whether a plea colloquy’s understating the potential penalty is subject to harmless error analysis, such that if the subsequently-imposed sentence doesn’t exceed the misadvised maximum, plea-withdrawal isn’t supported.

The details: Taylor was charged as a repeater with an offense carrying an underlying maximum of 6 years with the enhancer adding a potential 2 years.