On Point

State v. Juan Angel Orengo, 2011AP137, District 1, 2/28/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Orengo: Robert R. Henak; case activity

Counsel’s failure to attempt severance, from a drug charge, of a felon-in-possession-of-weapon count, didn’t amount to ineffective assistance.

¶8        Wisconsin law recognizes that guns and drug dealers go together.  See State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86,

David M. Siegel, “What (Can) (Should) (Must) Defense Counsel Withhold from The Prosecution in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Proceedings?,” The Champion, Vol. 18, No. 35, December 2011 

Must-read exegesis of ABA Formal Opinion 10-456, for anyone litigating, or on the business end of, an ineffective-assistance claim. Some highlights:

• “The attorney-client privilege and the obligation of confidentiality continue beyond the representation, and while a former client’s IAC claim impliedly waives the privilege with respect to allegations concerning lawyer-client communications,

on review of published opinion; for Avery: Keith A. Findley, Tricia J. Bushnell; case activity; prior post

Newly Discovered Evidence / Interest of Justice – New Forensic Method

Issues (composed by On Point): 

1. Whether new scientific photogrammetric analyses by expert witnesses, indicating that the suspect in video surveillance was shorter than Avery, entitles him to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Dane Co. DHS v. Sophia S., 2011AP2639, District 4, 2/23/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sophia S.: Faun M. Moses; case activity

Although the parent isn’t required to object to the sufficiency of evidence adduced in support of a default judgment on grounds for termination (the court rejecting the County’s argument on this point), there was a sufficient factual basis for the default.

Wetzel v. John Lambert, USSC No. 11-38, 2/21/12, vacating and remanding 633 F.3d 126 (3rd Cir. 2011)

Lambert claimed that state prosecutors withheld exculpatory information: a “police activity sheet” that arguably suggested someone other than, or perhaps in addition to, himself committed the offense (robbery and murder); and that could have been used to impeach the principal state’s witness. The state (Pennsylvania) court deemed the information too ambiguous to show that someone else had committed the robbery,

State v. Sean T. Powell, 2012 WI App 33 (recommended for publication); for Powell: Richard L. Kaiser; case activity

Conviction for CCW, § 941.23, requires proof of a “dangerous weapon,” which is in turn defined under §  939.22(10) to include “any firearm.” The pattern instruction, Wis JI-Criminal 910 embellishes the definition: “A firearm is a weapon that acts by force of gunpowder.” Powell argues that, because the State failed to show that his loaded,

Howes v. Randall Lee Fields, USSC No. 10-680, 2/21/12, reversing 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir 2010); arguably abrogating, State v. Tonnie D. Armstrong, 223 Wis.2d 331, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999)

Habeas – Review, Generally 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

State v. Anthony J. Wilson, 2011AP1782-CR, District 4, 2/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wilson: Joseph F. Fischer; case activity

A known citizen-informant’s report of a hit-and-run collision he observed, including pointing out the vehicle as it fled the scene, was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion for a stop, notwithstanding an inaccurate detail in the report (the vehicle’s color).

¶24      While not controlling here, 

State v. Sherri A. Wittrock, 2011AP1538-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wittrock: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶7        Where, as here, an officer relies on information provided by dispatch, “reasonable suspicion is assessed by looking at the collective knowledge of police officers.”  See State v. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5,

State v. Jordan T. Griffith, 2011AP2226-CR, District 2, 2/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Griffith: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

¶5        In order for an investigatory stop to be justified by reasonable suspicion, the officer must have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.”  State v. Walli, 2011 WI App 86,