On Point

Marilyn Mulero v. Thompson, 7th Cir No. 10-3875, 2/7/12

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Procedural Bar 

Muleros’ failure to present various claims “through one complete round of state court review” operates as procedural default; citing, Smith v. McKee, 598 F.3d 374, 382 (7th Cir. 2010).

… While Mulero did present numerous other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the Illinois state trial court and in her petition for review to the Illinois Supreme Court,

State v. Michael A. Imbruglia, 2011AP1373-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Imbruglia: Rick Ramirez; case activity

In circuit court, Imbruglia successfully challenged use of a Colorado conviction as an OWI enhancer (on the ground that statute isn’t “substantially similar” to Wisconsin’s). However, after another OWI arrest the very next day, the State reasserted that same conviction to enhance the new charge.

State v. James M. Johnson, 2011AP2374-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Evidence – Johnson left voicemail message on complainant’s work phone – held sufficient to sustain conviction for violating temporary restraining order.

¶8        Regarding the nature of the voice mail message and its violation of the TRO, the TRO itself states that Johnson is to “avoid contact that harasses or intimidates the petitioner,” contact defined as including contact by phone.  

State v. Zachary Ryan Wiegand, 2011AP939-CR, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Wiegand: Brian C. Findley; case activity

Despite initially waiving his Miranda rights, Wiegand later unequivocally asserted his right to silence (“I don’t want to say anything more”); nonetheless, the interrogating officer did not scrupulously honor this invocation, and the ensuing statement along with all derivative evidence is therefore suppressed.

Chippewa County Dept. of Human Services v. James A., 2011AP2613, District 3, 2/7/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for James A.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

¶18      James does not allege Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) implicates a First Amendment right.  Therefore, the threshold question is whether James’ conduct plainly falls within the statute’s proscriptions.  If it does, he is precluded from challenging the statute on vagueness grounds. 

7th circuit decision, imposing discipline 

Sanctions – Abandonment of Client 

It is apparent from this final motion for additional time that Boyle-Saxton elected to put work for other clients ahead of her obligations to Rodriguez and this court. That is unprofessional; lawyers have an ethical obligation to take no more work than they can perform. …

…

She is unfit to practice law in this court.

7th circuit decision, denying habeas in relief

Habeas – Standard of Review – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

When “no state court has squarely addressed the merits” of a habeas claim, however, we review the claim under the pre-AEDPA standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Under this “more generous standard,” George v. Smith, 586 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2009), “we review the petitioner’s constitutional claim with deference to the state court,

Dane Co. DHS v. Kevin D., 2011AP2748, District 4, 2/2/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kevin: Steven Zaleski; case activity

Kevin’s failure to respond to the County requests for admission, § 804.11(2), led the trial court to deem those requests admitted, and then to grant summary judgment as to grounds based on the “deemed admissions.” The court of appeals rejects Kevin’s challenge to the admissions: he was given adequate notice as to the consequences for failure to respond,

Heather T. C. v. Donald M. H., 2010AP467, District 2, 2/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Donald: Thomas K. Voss; case activity

Failure to object at trial waived appellate challenge to jury instructions and verdict form that combined two separate periods of abandonment as grounds for termination.

 ¶6        Failure to object to proposed jury instructions or verdicts at the instruction and verdict conference constitutes waiver of any error in the instructions or verdicts.  

State v. Anthony C. Boyden, 2012 WI App 38 (recommended for publication); for Boyden: Rex Anderegg; case activity

Information provided by Boyden before his sentencing, which didn’t bear fruit until much later, supported a new factor-based request for sentence modification. State v. Doe, 2005 WI App 68, 280 Wis. 2d 731, 697 N.W.2d 101, followed.

¶14      Boyden’s motion for sentence modification addresses in detail the factors set forth in Doe.