On Point

Columbia County v. Mark Devos, 2010AP2349, District 4, 5/19/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Devos: Rex Anderegg; case activity

The DOT Informing the Accused form that was read to Devos contained language beyond that specified in § 343.305(4): “In addition, under 2003 Wisconsin Act 97, your operating privileges will also be suspended if a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance is in your blood.” (This information must be provided to an accused pursuant to § 343.305(8).) Devos argues that DOT thereby effectively amended § 343.305(4) without legislative authorization,

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jesse Schaefer, 2010AP2485, District 2, 5/18/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schaefer: James A. Gramling, Jr.; case activity

¶4        As a threshold matter, we address the Village’s contention that the municipal court lacked competency to proceed on Schaefer’s Wis. Stat. § 806.07 motion to reopen.  Whether a court has lost competence to proceed presents a question of law that we review de novo.  

State v. William J. Zarda, 2011AP386-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Zarda: Ricky Cveykus; case activity

Under settled authority, the disorderly conduct statute, § 947.01, is neither overbroad (¶5, citing State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725); nor vague (¶6, citing State v. Zwicker,

Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011 WI 30, on certification; for Jacob T.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

TPR – Grounds, § 48.415(6) – “Substantial Parental Relationship”

¶22  The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility. 

certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity, circuit court affirmed 2012 WI 93

Plea Procedure – Personal Presence

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Jon Soto’s statutory right to be physically present during a plea hearing was violated when the judge conducted the hearing through video teleconferencing and whether this issue was properly preserved.

State v. Deshon C. Matthews, 2011 WI App 92 (recommended for publication); for Matthews: Paul G. Bonneson; case activity

Terry Stop – Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion supported stop of Matthews, when police on patrol saw him wearing a ski mask and hoodie late at night in a high-crime area near a woman who was walking away form him and who appeared to be frightened.

State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”

Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).

¶9        When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.  

State v. Isaac Hughes, Sr., 2011 WI App 87 (recommended for publication); for Hughes: Benbow P. Cheesman, Jr.; case activity

Conviction for escape, § 946.42(3), may be sustained even if the jury never actually saw the judgment of conviction that landed the defendant in custody.

¶12      We agree with the trial court that, when considered in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial,

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,