On Point

Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11

State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.

State v. Derek J. Copeland, 2011 WI App 28; for Copeland: David Leeper; case activity

Trial court has discretion under § 906.15(3) to order an attorney not to discuss with a sequestered witness who hasn’t yet testified the testimony of other witnesses; this authority extends to barring counsel from providing the sequestered witness with a transcript of prior-witness testimony. The trial court in this instance misperceived a lack of such authority,

State v. Robert S. Powless, 2010AP1116-CR, District 3/4, 2/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Powless: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

At an evidentiary hearing on a “Hampton” violation (failure to assure defendant knows the judge isn’t bound by the plea agreement), the State satisfied its burden of proving that Powless in fact knew the judge could exceed the State’s sentencing recommendation.

¶37      Our conclusion is based on the following. 

State v. Sidney Clark, 2010AP790, District 1, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Clark: John A. Pray; case activity

Clark can’t show prejudice from the deficient performance he alleges, therefore he isn’t entitled to a Machner hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶21      A postconviction hearing is necessary to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v.

Winnebago County DHS v. Jenny L. G.-J., 2009AP2956, District 2, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jenny L. G.-J.: Theresa J. Schmieder; case activity

The privilege attaching to interactions under direction of a family therapist, § 905.04(1)(b), doesn’t apply to information obtained by “dispositional staff” providing services under § 48.069.

¶11      Wisconsin Stat. § 48.069(1) defines a dispositional staffer as a member of “[t]he staff of the department [of children and families],

State v. Nicholas Fex, 2010AP1794-CR, District 1, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Fex: Wendy A. Patrickus; case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported stop of only car seen leaving bar parking lot, at high rate of speed, following report of fight at the bar.

¶8        Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the high rate of speed at which Fex left the bar together with the officers’ knowledge that a fight had been reported at that bar,

City of Mequon v. Monica Maureen Cooley, 2010AP2142, District 2, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Cooley: Dudley A. Williams; case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported early-morning stop of car in otherwise empty parking lot.

¶7        We agree with the circuit court that Brandemuehl conducted a lawful Terry stop.  Brandemuehl could point to specific and articulable facts[3] (Cooley turning into the parking lot of a closed movie theatre early on New Year’s morning),

Waukesha County v. Kathleen R. H., 2010AP2571-FT, District 2, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kathleen R.H.: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

The evidence supported ch. 51 mental health recommitment for a period of 12 months.

¶8        Here, Kathleen misconstrues WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) as requiring proof, apart from that contained in her treatment record, that she would be a danger to herself or others if treatment were withdrawn.  

Walworth County DH&HS v. Andrea O., 2010AP2938, District 2, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Andrea O.:  Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Evidence supported jury verdict on abandonment as to grounds for terminating parental rights, as against claim of good cause (incarceration) for conceded failure to communicate with the child.

¶8        The record reflects that Andrea may have sent a letter to her caseworker,

State v. Richard L. Daniels, 2010AP1715-CR, District 3, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Daniels: John M. Carroll; case activity

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Voluntary Intoxication

Voluntary intoxication requires that the defendant establish utter lack of capability to form the requisite intent; because Daniels’ version couldn’t make this showing, counsel’s failure to pursue the defense wasn’t deficient performance.

¶12      It was reasonable for Daniels’ trial counsel to view Daniels’ version of events as inconsistent with a voluntary intoxication defense,