On Point

Waupaca County v. Heather M. Krueger, 2010AP1290, District 4, 3/10/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Krueger: John M. Carroll; case activity

Citizen’s detention of driver (for suspected drunk driving) until police arrived to effectuate probable cause-based arrest can’t support suppression of evidence because no state action was involved.

¶5        Krueger seeks suppression of evidence of her intoxicated driving obtained after she was stopped by Sparks,

Dodge Co. HSHD v. James R., 2010AP3092, District 4, 3/10/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity; for James R.: Steven Zaleski

Evidence that the father sought admitted to show the County’s motive for filing the petition – “that the County’s real motivation for filing was not because the County believed he posed a substantial threat to the children, but rather to facilitate adoption”

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Batson Challenge

Scope of the remand inquiry for the government to proffer nonracial justification for striking a minority juror is limited to the original reason offered during voir dire, new post hoc justifications being inadmissible. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), discussed and followed:

… Accordingly, Miller-El II instructs that when ruling on a Batson challenge,

Kenosha County v. Jodi A. Braune, 2010AP834, District 2, 3/9/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Braune: Theodore B. Kmiec, III; case activity

¶7        We hold that under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 346.13(3), Braune’s deviation over the fog line was sufficient to establish probable cause that Braune committed a traffic violation.  When the deputy observed Braune’s conduct, he had probable cause that Braune did not drive “in the lane designated.”  See § 346.13(3). 

Richardson v. Henderson, 2010AP1765, District 2, 3/9/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

¶7, n.4:

Our supreme court has held that “when the supreme court overrules a court of appeals decision, the court of appeals decision no longer possesses any precedential value, unless this court expressly states otherwise.”  Blum v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins. Co.

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Briefing – Argumentation

¶10      We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3]  We are also disturbed by the tendentious tone of both parties’ briefs and remind counsel that respect for the courts and counsel requires civility.  See Wis. SCR 62.02; Aspen Services,

State v. Lawrence Williams, 2010AP1028, District 1, 3/8/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity; prior history: 220 Wis.2d 458, 583 N.W.2d 845 (Ct.App. 1998)

Williams fails to provide a “sufficient reason” to overcome the serial litigation bar on his § 974.06 motion following direct appeal. He posits ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective in various respects.

State v. Kerry J. Collins, 2010AP788-CR, District 1, 3/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Collins: Gary Grass; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction under § 941.10, court rejecting Collins’ argument that State failed to prove he was the person who set off flare in City Hall bathroom. Whatever weaknesses and discrepancies existed as to culpability merely raised questions for the jury to resolve;

Henry W. Skinner v. Switzer, USSC No. 09-9000, 3/7/11

A convicted state prisoner may utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek DNA testing of crime-scene evidence.

When may a state prisoner, complaining of unconstitutional state action, pursue a civil rights claim under §1983, and when is habeas corpus the prisoner’s sole remedy? …

We summarized the relevant case law most recently in Wilkinson v.

Wall v. Kahlil Kholi, USSC No. 09-868, 3/7/11

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim” tolls the 1-year limitation period for filing a federal habeas petition. 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(2). The question in this case is whether a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law tolls the limitation period,