On Point

FCC v. AT&T, USSC No. 09-1279, 3/1/11

The “personal privacy” exemption in the federal Freedom of Information Act doesn’t apply to corporations, though they are considered “persons” under the Act.

… Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own. The noun “crab” refers variously to a crustacean and a type of apple, while the related adjective “crabbed” can refer to handwriting that is “difficult to read,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 527 (2002);

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eric A.:  pro se; case activity

Expungement – Delinquency Adjudication, § 938.355(4m)(a)

Denial of petition for expungement of repeated sexual assault of child adjudication is affirmed.

¶8        Here, the court determined that the offense was too serious, and it would be against public policy, to permit expungement.  The court’s order stated society would be harmed by granting expungement. 

State v. Winston B. Eison, 2011 WI App 52; for Eison: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

Preservation of Issue – Motion in Limine

Eison objected to introduction of evidence of his arrest on an unrelated offense via motion in limine, which the trial court granted. At trial, however, the court allowed the State to introduce this evidence. Eison didn’t need to lodge additional objection to preserve the issue for review.

Michigan v. Bryant, USSC No. 09-150

At respondent Richard Bryant’s trial, the court admitted statements that the victim, Anthony Covington, made to police officers who discovered him mortally wounded in a gas station parking lot. … We hold that the circumstances of the interaction between Covington and the police objectively indicate that the “primary purpose of the interrogation” was “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis,

Walker v. Charles W. Martin, USSC No. 09-996, 2/23/11

State court time limit for seeking postconviction relief needn’t be “fixed,” but instead may be discretionary in nature, for purposes of the habeas default rule.

In a recent decision, Beard v. Kindler, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), this Court clarified that a state procedural bar may count as an adequate and independent ground for denying a federal habeas petition even if the state court had discretion to reach the merits despite the default.

State v. Derek J. Copeland, 2011 WI App 28; for Copeland: David Leeper; case activity

Trial court has discretion under § 906.15(3) to order an attorney not to discuss with a sequestered witness who hasn’t yet testified the testimony of other witnesses; this authority extends to barring counsel from providing the sequestered witness with a transcript of prior-witness testimony. The trial court in this instance misperceived a lack of such authority,

State v. Robert S. Powless, 2010AP1116-CR, District 3/4, 2/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Powless: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

At an evidentiary hearing on a “Hampton” violation (failure to assure defendant knows the judge isn’t bound by the plea agreement), the State satisfied its burden of proving that Powless in fact knew the judge could exceed the State’s sentencing recommendation.

¶37      Our conclusion is based on the following. 

State v. Sidney Clark, 2010AP790, District 1, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Clark: John A. Pray; case activity

Clark can’t show prejudice from the deficient performance he alleges, therefore he isn’t entitled to a Machner hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶21      A postconviction hearing is necessary to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v.

Winnebago County DHS v. Jenny L. G.-J., 2009AP2956, District 2, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jenny L. G.-J.: Theresa J. Schmieder; case activity

The privilege attaching to interactions under direction of a family therapist, § 905.04(1)(b), doesn’t apply to information obtained by “dispositional staff” providing services under § 48.069.

¶11      Wisconsin Stat. § 48.069(1) defines a dispositional staffer as a member of “[t]he staff of the department [of children and families],

State v. Nicholas Fex, 2010AP1794-CR, District 1, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Fex: Wendy A. Patrickus; case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported stop of only car seen leaving bar parking lot, at high rate of speed, following report of fight at the bar.

¶8        Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the high rate of speed at which Fex left the bar together with the officers’ knowledge that a fight had been reported at that bar,