On Point

court of appeals decision; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether a trial judge has a sua sponte duty to strike a prosepctive juror who is an in-law of the judge.

Whether defense counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to remove the judge’s in-law renders harmless any error in the judge’s failure to remove that juror.

See prior post for further discussion.

on certification; for Spaeth: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Issue (formulated by On Point):

Whether a statement made to law enforcement following a probationer’s honest accounting to his probation agent may derive from a “legitimate source wholly independent of compelled testimony” and therefore admissible in a criminal case, notwithstanding the promise of immunity for such statements when made to probation agents.

See prior post for further discussion.

decision below: unpublished; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether Domke was denied effective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s: failure to object to inadmissible hearsay in the form of a social worker’s testimony reciting the complainant’s recitation of the alleged sexual assaults; producing, without first interviewing her, the complainant’s mother as a defense witness who proceeded to testify that she believed the complainant “100 percent.”

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Anderson: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Anderson BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Guilty Plea – Criminal Damage to Property – Factual Basis

¶6        To be found guilty of criminal damage to property, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

1. The defendant caused damage to physical property.  

Oneida County v. Michael B., 2010AP002216-FT, District 3, 2/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Michael B.: Lora B. Cerone. SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Mental Recommitment – Instruction on Dangerousness

The following oral jury instruction didn’t impermissibly direct the jury to find dangerousness, on trial for mental recommitment: “This is a recommitment proceeding, therefore, the law requires that the requirement of a recent act,

City of Shawano v. Darlene F. Sense, 2010AP2193-FT, District 3, 2/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity; Memo Br.; Memo Resp.; Memo Reply

¶10      As a final matter, we address certain deficiencies in Sense’s appellate brief.  First, Sense’s repeated references to “appellant” and “respondent” throughout her brief violate WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(i), which requires reference to the parties by name,

on petition for review of published decision; for Hanson: Robert R. Henak, Chad A. Lanning; case activity

Issues (provided by court):

Whether a driver of a vehicle can be convicted of attempting to elude a law enforcement officer under Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) while on a cell phone with a 911 intake dispatcher and driving to a police station.

Whether an officer is a “victim” (See State v.

Brown County Dept. of Human Services v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, affirming unpublished decision; for Brenda B.: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

¶3   Given that a finding of parental unfitness does not necessarily result in an involuntary termination of parental rights, we determine that the circuit court was not obligated to inform Brenda that by pleading no contest she was waiving her constitutional right to parent. 

district court decision, denying respondent’s motion to amend judgment granting habeas relief (post on original grant, here).

Habeas – State’s Waiver

The State’s failure to raise certain arguments, prior to grant of 2254 relief, waived its right to press those points on a Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment granting relief.

The respondent in this case, like in most petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,

Koch v. Neumann, 2010AP1531, District 3, 2/1/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The contemnor argues that a remedial sanction (30 days’ jail, stayed for 1 year conditioned on no further violations of prior judgment) imposed by the trial court was unsupported because the contemptuous conduct had already terminated. Although remedial sanctions are permissible only for continuing contempt,