On Point

Dane Co. DHS v. Susan P. S, 2010AP573, District 4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se

Determination of the “best interests of the child” at TPR disposition includes consideration of various factors, including the “wishes of the child.” The TPR court need not hear directly from the child, but may instead take evidence of the child’s wishes from other sources.

Court discusses evidentiary issues that appear to be too inconsequential,

State v. Marlon M. Anderson, 2010AP742-CR, District 1/4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Angela Conrad Kachelski; Anderson BiC; State Resp.

A defendant’s statement made voluntarily but in violation of Miranda isn’t admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but is admissible if the defendant testifies and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. The question raised here relates to how such inconsistency is measured: whether outright contradictions are necessary,

State v. Brian R. Rogers, 2010AP1300-CR, District 4, 12/9/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; State’s Resp. Br.

Even assuming Rogers violated no traffic law, his driving pattern provided reasonable suspicion for a stop:

¶10      Here too, the totality of the circumstances provided Lambrecht with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.  Lambrecht observed Rogers’ vehicle weave both within and outside its lane multiple times over the span of approximately one mile.  

State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC;State Resp.; Reply

(Issue of plea bargain breach discussed in separate post, here.)

On sentencing Campbell for sexual assault of his daughter, the trial court had, and properly exercised, authority under § 973.049(2) to bar Campbell’s contact with his son until completion of sex offender treatment.

State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC; State Resp.; Reply

(Sentencing issue in the case discussed separately, here.)

Plea Bargain – Breach

The plea agreement required the prosecutor to recommend a 20-year sentence, comprised of 5-7 years’ confinement and the balance on extended supervision,

State v. Kenneth E., 2010AP1520, District 1, 12/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Kenneth E.: Mary D. Scholle, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

(The Court’s Case Access site has posted Kenneth E.’s principal and reply briefs. This is atypical; the court’s normal practice is not to post briefs, because of the confidentiality that attends TPRs.  Though seemingly not barred by statute or rule, links to the briefs won’t be provided here in deference to the court’s past practice,

State v. LaDonna E., 2010AP1733, District 1, 12/7/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for LaDonna E.: Jane S. Earle

Termination of parental rights upheld. Mother (LaDonna E.), after defaulting on grounds phase, challenged termination on basis that child’s aunt, who had custody and wanted to adopt child, should be appointed guardian instead.

¶9        The circuit court noted that “Kenny will be adopted.”  See Wis.

circuit court decision (Judge Richard Sankovitz); for Henderson: Paul A. Ksicinski, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Illegal Voting, § 12.13(1)(a) – Voting Rights Acts

Henderson is charged with illegal voting because he allegedly voted notwithstanding his status as a felon still under supervision (which would made him ineligible to vote). He raises as a defense the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 45 U.S.C. § 1973(a): the Act bars disenfranchisement “on account of race” 

seventh circuit decision; denying rehearing and amending panel decision, Coleman v. Hardy (per curiam , 2/7/11)

Habeas – Defaulted Claim – Assertion of Innocence

Although Coleman defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it in state court, his allegation of actual innocence supports a “gateway” evidentiary hearing to determine whether to reach the merits of the defaulted claim.

Default may be excused if the petitioner can show 1) “cause”

State v. Gerard W. Carter, 2010 WI 132, reversing 2009 WI App 156; for Carter: Craig M. Kuhary; State BiC; Carter Resp.; Reply

Prior DL suspension under Illinois’ “zero tolerance” law (which suspends or revokes operating privileges of drivers under legal drinking age with any alcohol concentration) satisfies § 343.307(1)(d) and therefore supports OWI enhancement,