On Point

State v. Matthew C. Parmley, 2010 WI App 79; for Parmley: Christopher M. Eippert; BiC: Resp.; Reply

A sex offender may obtain an exception from the registration requirement 0f § 301.45(1m)2, if “the person had not attained the age of 19 years and was not more than 4 years older or not more than 4 years younger than the child.” At the time of his offense,

State v. Brian K. Sowatzke, 2010 WI App 81; for Sowatzke: Andrew R. Walter; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶13      Sowatzke had two countable OWI “convictions, suspensions or revocations” (i.e., he had two OWI convictions) at the time he was arrested on May 9; he had a BAC of 0.048 percent at the time he was arrested on May 9; his legal BAC limit was 0.08 percent at the time he was arrested on May 9.  

publication orders, 5/26/10

2008AP003192 2010 WI App 63 Charles F. Reuben, M.D. v. Keith D. Koppen

2008AP003235 2010 WI App 64 Curt Andersen v. Department of Natural Resources

2009AP000094 2010 WI App 65 Claudia D. Stumpner v. Charles C. Cutting, Jr.

2009AP000747 2010 WI App 66 Kalvin Loppnow v. Steven Bielik

2009AP001576 2010 WI App 67 Chad Novell v. Anthony Migliaccio

2009AP001669 2010 WI App 68 Roger H.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Lonergan: Owen R. Williams; BiC; Resp.

Reasonable Suspicion – OWI Stop

Stop supported by reasonable suspicion, where vehicle “‘deviated constantly’ from a direct line of travel” and “made several abrupt course corrections,” albeit within its own lane. United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1993) and United States v.

State v. Michael James Carter, 2010 WI 40

Wisconsin supreme court decision, reversing unpublished summary order; for Carter: John T. Wasielewski; BiC (State); Resp.; Reply

Counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to search for admissibility of sexual conduct evidence as an exception to the rape shield law. Therefore, Carter can’t show deficient performance. Separately, this evidence wouldn’t have fallen within an exception anyway,

United States Supreme Court per curiam decision

Habeas Review

Petitioner Lawrence Jefferson, who has been sentenced to death, claimed in both state and federal courts that his lawyers were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury that he suffered as a child.  The state court rejected that claim after making a finding that the attorneys were advised by an expert that such investigation was unnecessary.

Question Presented:

May a convicted prisoner seeking access to biological evidence for DNA testing assert that claim in a claim in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or is such a claim cognizable only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus?

Docket: 09-9000

• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

Scotusblog analysis notes,

U.S. v. O’Brien, USSC No. 08-1569, 5/24/10

§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), which exposes a person convicted of possessing, using or carrying a machinegun during certain federal crimes to a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years is an offense element subject to proof beyond reasonable doubt at trial rather than a penalty enhancer provable by mere preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.

The border between offense element and sentence enhancer remains indistinct at crucial junctures.

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

Wisconsin supreme court decision

Sixty-day suspension imposed for conceded misconduct consisting of: failure to take timely action with respect to civil forfeiture action against client; failure to respond to client’s reasonable requests for information and to timely communicate case developments; failure to explain legal implications of various dealings related to representation, ¶20.