On Point

decision below: unpublished (2009AP118); for Burns: David R. Karpe

Issue:

Is the Appellant entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice where (a) the circuit court banned the Appellant from presenting evidence that the victim’s post-assaultive behavior and loss of virginity was due to her having been sexually assaulted by her grandfather rather than the Appellant, and (b) the state argued that there was no other explanation for the victim’s behavior than that the Appellant was guilty?

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Dewitt: Thomas E. Hayes; BiC; Resp.

Detention for 90 Minutes not Unreasonable

Stop of motorist Dewitt by officer who, because he was off-duty, could not under departmental rules himself perform arrest, wasn’t unnecessarily prolonged by 90 minute delay until on-duty officer could show up.

¶15 Dewitt has presented no evidence to show that Officer Geffert,

State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2010 WI 38, reversing 2009 WI App 26, prior history omitted; for Jensen: Robert H. Friebert; BiC; Resp.; Reply

¶1   … The issue presented is whether Waukesha County Circuit Court is the proper venue for Jensen’s trial because it is the “circuit court for the county where the defendant resides”

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Jenkins: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Search & Seizure – Denial of Motion to Suppress without Evidentiary Hearing

¶2 n.2:

Jenkins’ motion papers were inadequate and the circuit court would have been correct in denying him an evidentiary hearing. All Jenkins filed was a one-page motion with the assertion the officers had looked inside his windows;

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication);  for Miske: Sarvan Singh; BiC; Resp.

Terry Stop – Voluntary Encounter

A voluntary encounter, rather than Terry stop, occurred where Miske came to a stop when approaching two squads flanking “an unlit back country road” at 1:00 a.m.:

¶12      When Miske and his partner stopped, they were on a narrow road,

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Custody Requirement, sec. 974.06

¶7        However, Olson is barred from collaterally attacking his criminal conviction under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 because he is no longer “‘in custody under sentence of a court.’”  See State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327, 329, 240 N.W.2d 635 (1976) (quoting § 974.06 and recognizing that circuit court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion for postconviction relief brought under § 974.06 if the defendant has completed his sentence). 

State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,

U.S. v. Comstock, USSC No. 08-1224, 5/17/10

The federal scheme for detaining the equivalent of ch. 980 sexually violent persons beyond release date from federal prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1848, is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court “assume(s), but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances.”

Graham v. Florida, USSC No. 08-7412, 5/17/10

In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.

Question Presented:

Whether a state court sentence-reduction motion consisting of a plea for leniency constitutes an “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), thus tolling the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition.

• Opinion below (1st Circuit)
• Petition for certiorari
• Brief in opposition
• Petitioner’s reply

Principal impetus for review seems to be (per usual) a split of authority,