On Point

7th circuit decision

Permissive Driver, Standing to Challenge Car Search

It is well-established that a driver of a borrowed vehicle may establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle even though that driver is not the owner of the vehicle. … Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of a driver to assert a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches of a vehicle where the driver is operating that vehicle with the permission of the owner.

supreme court decision; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Court of Appeals Authority to Declare Dicta

¶57     By concluding that a statement in a supreme court opinion is dictum, the court of appeals necessarily withdraws or modifies language from that opinion, contrary to our directive in Cook. …

¶58     If the court of appeals could dismiss a statement in a prior case from this court as dictum,

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Sterling: Dianne M. Erickson; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Charging Decision – Judicial Involvement
Increase in the charge, following trial judge’s veiled suggestion to the prosecutor that such an increase would be appropriate, wasn’t occasioned by judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, ¶¶16-22.

Initially charged with first-degree reckless injury, Sterling was ultimately convicted on an amended charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide.

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Henry: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Counsel – Request for Substitute
Trial court denial of request for new counsel is a discretionary determination, reviewed deferentially under the factors set forth in State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988), ¶¶17-18.

State v. Chester C., 2009AP2824, District I, 5/4/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); for Chester C.: Dianne M. Erickson

TPR – Effective Assistance of Counsel
Failure to demonstrate prejudice within the meaning of Strickland dooms this ineffective-assistance claim that trial counsel failed to object to various hearsay statements:

¶7     Other than complaining that his trial lawyer did not object to the hearsay we have recounted,

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Exculpatory Evidence
Statements of three eyewitnesses, not disclosed to the defendant, that would have implicated the state’s principal eyewitness and otherwise impeached his credibility and that of 2 other state’s witnesses was “material.” It is reasonably probable that disclosure would have netted a different result, and the state court’s contrary conclusion unreasonably applied clearly established law.

The court stresses,

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

certification

Issue:

Can a circuit court disqualify retained counsel-of-record in a civil suit, thereby denying the client the right to representation by chosen counsel and restricting the attorney’s right to practice law in a civil action, where the attorney previously represented a nonparty witness for the opposing side?

The Ciccantellis sued a condo association for a personal injury. Turns out plaintiffs’ counsel had also represented the association’s property manager;

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sporle: Robert J. Jackson; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Implied Consent Procedure, § 343.305(2)

¶12 The officer complied with her obligations to provide the “Informing the Accused” information and to make an alternative test available. The officer informed Sporle that, if he took the requested test, he could have an alternative test free of charge,

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Davison: Steven Cohen; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Reasonable Suspicion – OWI
Reasonable suspicion found to administer field sobriety tests, where Davison admitted drinking 4 or 5 beers, had alcohol on his breath, was in close proximity to the bar where he had been drinking, and it was bar closing time.

“Bar closing time”