On Point

State v. N.H., 2022AP1945, District 1, 03/14/2023, (one-judge decision, not eligible for publication) case activity

This case presents a relatively straightforward application of how Bangert applies to termination of parental rights pleas. As noted by the decision, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court is currently considering a more nuanced version of the issue in State v. A.G. In Nico’s (N.H.) case, the court of appeals again holds that a circuit court’s incorrect explanation of the applicable statutory standard at disposition entitles the parent to an evidentiary hearing under Bangert to determine whether the state can prove the parent’s plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Opinion, ¶1.

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification granted 3/24/23;  remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs) case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?

State v. Y.P.V., 2022AP1935-36, 3/21/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals reversed and remanded this TPR for two reasons. First, the mom made a prima facie case that her “no contest” plea to grounds was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, during the plea colloquy, the circuit court misstated the law that would apply during the disposition. Then, at the disposition phase, the circuit court failed to apply the proper standard of law and misstated an important fact.

Waukesha County DHHS v. M.A.S., 2022AP877, District 2, 3/22/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.B. (Rose), a daughter of M.A.S. (Mary), filed an appeal of an order granting the County’s petition for a protective placement of Mary. The court of appeals holds Rose doesn’t have standing to appeal the order.

State v. Jenny E. Clark, 2022AP495-CR, District 4, 3/23/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Clark’s Minnesota administrative suspension for operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration counts as a prior OWI conviction under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213.

The filing of an Emergency Protective Placement petition under §55.135(1) triggers a probable cause hearing within 72 hours. Once the court finds probable cause it may order a temporary protective placement for up to 30 days pending a hearing on a permanent protective placement. Wis. Stat. §55.135(5). Sometimes the client wants to exercise her right to an independent comprehensive evaluation under §55.10(4)(e) and §55.11(2), yet has trouble finding a doctor who can complete it within 30 days. May the client stipulate to extend the temporary protective placement so that she can obtain the evaluation?

State v. Adekola John Adekale, 2022AP1351, 3/9/20223, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Adekale’s vehicle for speeding and having a bad taillight. Adekale parked his car in a parking lot on the south side of a Motel 6. There were six passengers in the car, who “kept chiming in” and asking about the stop. They were boisterous and seemed to have been drinking. The officer asked them to leave, and they walked toward the hotel’s entrances, though the officer could not see if they went in.

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

Brown County v. J.J., 2021AP1079, District 3, 3/7/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Before an Indian child subject to a CHIPS proceeding is placed out of the home of his or her parent or Indian guardian, § 48.028(4)(d)2. and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) both require, among other things, proof by clear and convincing evidence that “active efforts, as described in [§ 48.028(4)](g) 1., have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitation programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian child’s family and that those efforts have proved unsuccessful.” The court finds the County proved it made “active efforts” in this case.

State v. Linsey Nichole Howard, 2022AP1608-CR, District 2, 03/08/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

Prior to pleading guilty to operating a vehicle with a restricted, controlled substance as a second offense, Howard filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. The court of appeals affirms the denial of Howard’s motion based on the following circumstances: (1) she was driving at 12:53 a.m. without headlights on, (2) she was confused about where she was coming from and where she was going, (3) she appeared nervous, (4) she avoided eye contact, and (5) she failed the HGN field sobriety test (4) . (Opinion, ¶11).