On Point

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The identity theft charge against Baron, sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation as a government official, survives strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment (freedom of speech clause):

¶45      To survive strict scrutiny, the State has the burden to show that the “‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” 

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The charge of identity theft, based on Baron’s alleged conduct in sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation, is “content based” within the meaning of First Amendment analysis:

¶38      In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis.

Custodian of Records for Legislative Technology Services Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, on reconsideration 2004 WI 149

Issue/Holding:

¶34. When we review a John Doe subpoena, a foundational issue may be constitutional in nature. For example, does the issuance of a subpoena in a John Doe proceeding, the sole purpose of such proceeding being to investigate alleged criminal activity, have the potential to affect Fourth Amendment rights?

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinionF
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether “restrained or confined” element of false imprisonment was established where the defendant hugged the complainant tightly while committing an act of sexual contact.

Holding:

¶28      This court has previously explained that confinement is the “restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”

State v. Kelly R. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue/Holding: Support for warrantless entry of a residence to effectuate an arrest may be found where the offense is jailable, even if a misdemeanor; State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152 overruled:

¶27      Our review of the reasoning of Mikkelson, as compared with that of Welsh and Santana,

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue/Holding: Police had probable cause to believe Popke violated § 346.05, driving on right-side of highway:

¶16      In this case, the officer testified that he was sitting at a stop sign when the defendant turned left onto the road directly ahead of where the officer was sitting.

State v. Mitchell A. Lange, 2009 WI 49, reversing unpublished opinion
For Lange: Steven M. Cohen

Issue/Holding: Probable cause to arrest for OWI was based on the following factors:

¶24      First, the driving that Officer Hoffman and Officer Penly witnessed is relevant. The driving was not merely erratic and unlawful; it was the sort of wildly dangerous driving that suggests the absence of a sober decision maker behind the wheel.

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding:

¶37      We conclude that Wagner had an objectively reasonable basis for deciding that a motorist may have been in need of assistance when he stopped behind Kramer’s vehicle. Kramer was parked on the side of a highway after dark with his hazard flashers operating.

State v. Christopher S. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, affirming 2008 WI App 89
For Hoppe: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A court may incorporate a plea questionnaire form into the guilty plea colloquy, but only up to a point:

 ¶32     The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form provides a defendant and counsel the opportunity to review together a written statement of the information a defendant should know before entering a guilty plea.

State v. Tony Payano, 2009 WI 86, reversing 2008 WI App 74
For Payano: Patrick Cavanaugh Brennan

Issue: Payano was convicted of shooting at police officers who entered his apartment under a no-knock warrant; he claimed self-defense (i.e., defending himself against unknown armed intruders); over objection, the State presented an informant’s testimony that the day before he had been at Payano’s apartment and seen Payano with drugs and a handgun: the issue is whether this testimony was properly admitted to provide “context” for the event.