On Point

Portage County DH & HS v. C.S., 2022AP1090, District 4, 02/23/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

In what appears to be a first, the court of appeals addresses a grant of partial summary judgment against a parent specifically related to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services pursuant to a CHIPS order. See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a). One caveat being that the issue arises within the context of a postdisposition claim of ineffective assistance after trial counsel failed to file any response or affidavit opposing the county’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court affirms the summary judgment order and holds that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the county made a “reasonable effort” to provide services to C.S. that would have assisted him in meeting the conditions of return. (Opinion, ¶35).

On February 22, 2023, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related decision:

State v. Ayodeji J. Aderemi, 2023 WI App 8 (delay in upload of information on efiling system didn’t deprive circuit court of jurisdiction in criminal case)

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1138, 2/22/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Such a maddening case. J.D.J., a prisoner diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was going to have a hard enough time winning a jury trial regarding his ch. 51 initial commitment. But the circuit court made his uphill battle impossible through a series of highly questionable pre-trial and trial rulings. Then the court of appeals, relying on nothing beyond its gut (i.e. not case law) affirmed.

Wood County v. P.M.P., 2022AP1815, 2/23/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal, P.M.P.’s sole challenge was to the circuit court’s application of the “best interest of the child” factors in §48.426(3)(a)-(f). P.M.P. conceded that the circuit court adequately considered the “substantial relationship” factor, but its analysis of the other facts was too terse. The decision required reversal under s Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.

State v. Graham L. Stowe, 2021AP431-CR, District 3, 02/17/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Graham Stowe was found NGI in 2005 and committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 39 years and 6 months. Between 2007 and 2019, Stowe filed 10 petitions for conditional release. The same circuit court judge who committed Stowe in 2005 has presided over every subsequent proceeding. After five prior appeals, the court of appeals now agrees with Stowe that the circuit court was objectively biased at his 2019 conditional release hearing based on a totality of comments that demonstrate a “serious risk of actual bias.” As a result, the court reverses the circuit court and remands the case for a new conditional release hearing before a different judge. (Opinion, ¶2).

J.C. v. R.S., 2022AP1215 , 2/16/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a rare Chapter 55 reversal, the court of appeals held that the petitioner failed to prove that the individual under review had a degenerative brain disorder that was likely to be permanent.

Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022AP230, 2/17/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

“Catherine” appeals the extension of her ch. 51 commitment. The recommitment hearing was originally set for a few days before her previous extension would expire. But three days before that scheduled hearing, Catherine requested an independent examination. She, the court, and the county agreed to a “stipulation for temporary extension to commitment” for 60 days. The final hearing was held near the end of this 60 days, 57 days after her commitment had been set to expire before the stipulation.

R.G. v. S.P., 2022AP1876, District 4, 02/16/2023 (one judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

R.G. filed a petition to voluntarily terminate his parental rights to a non-marital child that he had not seen in over seven years. The circuit court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. R.G. pursued an appeal pro se, arguing that Wis. Stat. § 48.185 supported his petition in Dane County.

State v. Amber C. Debree, 2022AP1311-CR, 02/08/23, District II (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Debree’s disorderly conduct conviction stemmed from a physical altercation she had with her husband immediately after Debree learned he had impregnated her adult daughter. The sentencing court placed Debree on probation for two years after it questioned whether Debree was “truly accepting responsibility for her actions” and expressed concern about her criminal record. In response to the concerns about her criminal record, Debree moved the court to modify her sentence based on her history of being abused by her husband, which provided additional context to her actions in this case and some explanation for her criminal record. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirms the circuit court’s denial of her new factor claim because Debree could not show that her claimed new factor was “unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.” (Opinion, ¶8).

State v. Morris V. Seaton, 2021AP1399-CR, certification filed 2/8/23, certification granted, 3/24/23, remanded, 2023 WI 69;District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Question presented (from the court of appeals’ certification):

In light of the 2014 amendment of WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b) (2019-20), codifying and expanding the “greater latitude” rule and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶¶23-25, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, interpreting and applying that amendment, are State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982), and State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, still controlling law as they relate to the admissibility of prior nonconsensual sexual wrongs in cases involving an adult victim of an alleged sexual assault where consent is the primary issue?