On Point

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinionF
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether “restrained or confined” element of false imprisonment was established where the defendant hugged the complainant tightly while committing an act of sexual contact.

Holding:

¶28      This court has previously explained that confinement is the “restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”

State v. Kelly R. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue/Holding: Support for warrantless entry of a residence to effectuate an arrest may be found where the offense is jailable, even if a misdemeanor; State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152 overruled:

¶27      Our review of the reasoning of Mikkelson, as compared with that of Welsh and Santana,

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue/Holding: Police had probable cause to believe Popke violated § 346.05, driving on right-side of highway:

¶16      In this case, the officer testified that he was sitting at a stop sign when the defendant turned left onto the road directly ahead of where the officer was sitting.

State v. Mitchell A. Lange, 2009 WI 49, reversing unpublished opinion
For Lange: Steven M. Cohen

Issue/Holding: Probable cause to arrest for OWI was based on the following factors:

¶24      First, the driving that Officer Hoffman and Officer Penly witnessed is relevant. The driving was not merely erratic and unlawful; it was the sort of wildly dangerous driving that suggests the absence of a sober decision maker behind the wheel.

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding:

¶37      We conclude that Wagner had an objectively reasonable basis for deciding that a motorist may have been in need of assistance when he stopped behind Kramer’s vehicle. Kramer was parked on the side of a highway after dark with his hazard flashers operating.

State v. Christopher S. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, affirming 2008 WI App 89
For Hoppe: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A court may incorporate a plea questionnaire form into the guilty plea colloquy, but only up to a point:

 ¶32     The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form provides a defendant and counsel the opportunity to review together a written statement of the information a defendant should know before entering a guilty plea.

State v. Tony Payano, 2009 WI 86, reversing 2008 WI App 74
For Payano: Patrick Cavanaugh Brennan

Issue: Payano was convicted of shooting at police officers who entered his apartment under a no-knock warrant; he claimed self-defense (i.e., defending himself against unknown armed intruders); over objection, the State presented an informant’s testimony that the day before he had been at Payano’s apartment and seen Payano with drugs and a handgun: the issue is whether this testimony was properly admitted to provide “context” for the event.

State v. Corey Kleser, 2009 WI App 43, PFR filed 4/9/09
For Kleser: Robin E. Dorman, SPD Milwaukee Trial; Debra Flynn-Parrino, Devon M. Lee, SPD, Milwaukee Juvenile

Issue/Holding:

¶46      Wisconsin Stat. § 970.032(2) makes no provision for the admission of hearsay at a reverse waiver hearing. Where a statute does not specifically authorize hearsay, it is generally prohibited, see Wis. Stat.

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue / Holding:

¶26      In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Similar to the specific and articulable facts observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made the following observations over the course of approximately one block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road;

 “Qualified Expert Witnesses” Requirement

Issue: Whether the social worker expertise “beyond the normal” is required to qualify as an expert within the meaning of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).

Holding:

¶37 Because in D.S.P. the court affirmed an exercise of the circuit court’s discretion, we do not read D.S.P. to hold that 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) requires that social workers must have qualifications comparable to those of the two testifying there.