On Point

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28
For Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court properly considered a count for which Prineas was acquitted, as well as uncharged, “sexually inappropriate behavior,” ¶28, citing State v. David Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7.

State v. Corey E. Young, 2009 WI App 22, PFR filed 1/7/09
For Young: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: The trial court, in sentencing for first-degree intentional homicide, sufficiently explained why it was assigning extended supervision eligibility of 50 years’ confinement (rather than the 40 recommended by the State). Weight given each sentencing factor is committed to the trial court’s discretion, ¶24; the sentencing court in this instance reached its conclusion only after weighing a number of sentencing factors,

Johnbull K. Osagiede v. USA, 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir 2009)

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s ignorance of rights available, under VCCR Art. 36, to her Nigerian national client was deficient:

Osagiede’s claim is a common one in Sixth Amendment cases. In essence, Osagiede argues that his lawyer should have been aware of his legal rights under Article 36 and should have acted to protect them: “All lawyers that represent criminal defendants are expected to know the laws applicable to their client’s defense.” Julian v.

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, PFR filed 3/6/09
Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding: Trial court refusal to allow Prineas to substitute one retained counsel for another absent “an extraordinary reason,” where substitution would necessitate continuance of the scheduled trial over objection of the complainant and her family, upheld as proper exercise of discretion; Carlson v. Jess,

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, PFR filed 3/6/09
Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding:

¶14      In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel derived from the Sixth Amendment includes “the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” Id.

State v. Jason L. McClaren, 2009 WI 60, reversing 2008 WI App 118
For McClaren: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶21      It is well established that a defendant seeking to support a self-defense claim may attempt to “prov[e] prior specific instances of violence within [the defendant’s] knowledge at the time of the incident.”  State v. Wenger, 225 Wis.

State v. Ross M. Brandt, 2009 WI App 115
For Brandt: John M. Yackel

Issue/Holding: Although it carries a maximum penalty of 9 months’ imprisonment, hit-and-run causing injury less than serious bodily harm, §§ 346.67(1) and 346.74(5)(b), is a felony.

Obviously, this result is going to make life more difficult for hit-run representation, for the obvious reason: it’s one thing to advise your client to plead out to a misdemeanor,

State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161
For Patterson: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding: Based largely on State v. Jimmie Davison, 2003 WI 89 (multiple convictions for battery permissible so long as multiple batteries have been charged), the court holds that § 939.66(2) permits conviction for both §§ 940.02(2)(a) and 948.04(4)(a), ¶¶1-21. The offenses are not the same “in law”—each containing at least one element not in the other—and therefore Patterson bears the burden of overcoming a presumption in favor of cumulative punishment.

State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Evidence related to a penalty enhancer (such as a prior conviction in support of habitual criminality) is relevant only to sentence and “must be withheld from the jury’s knowledge,” ¶19, quoting Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis.  2d 464,

State v. Charles Lamar, 2009 WI App 133, PFR filed 9/10/09
For Lamar: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: No presumption of vindictiveness applied to resentencing by a different judge upon guilty pleas re-entered after the original trial court granted Lamar’s postconviction motion to withdraw the initial guilty pleas.

¶17      In Naydihor, our supreme court found that the Pearce presumption did not apply.