On Point

State ex rel. David C. Myers v. Smith, 2009 WI App 49
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Writ of certiorari “misdirected” to wrong respondent (in this instance, review of inmate complaint, improperly naming as respondent institution warden rather than DOC Secretary or designee) must be dismissed:

¶10      We begin by observing that certiorari “is available only for the purpose of reviewing a final determination.” Id.

State ex rel. David C. Myers v. Smith, 2009 WI App 49
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Inmate may not utilize discovery to bypass security-based restrictions on access to banned material such as pornography:

¶16      Inmates must not be allowed to evade security restrictions by simply filing suit or petitioning for writ of certiorari and obtaining prohibited materials through discovery. Due process does not mean that a prisoner has an absolute right to everything relevant to his or her case.

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court need not state separately why it chooses consecutive rather than concurrent terms; rather, this determination is made by considering the same factors as inform sentence length, ¶¶45-46.

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding: Sentence was based on proper exercise of discretion, including gravity of offense and defendant’s character and “long-term treatment needs,” ¶¶38-44.

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28
For Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court properly considered a count for which Prineas was acquitted, as well as uncharged, “sexually inappropriate behavior,” ¶28, citing State v. David Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7.

State v. Corey E. Young, 2009 WI App 22, PFR filed 1/7/09
For Young: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: The trial court, in sentencing for first-degree intentional homicide, sufficiently explained why it was assigning extended supervision eligibility of 50 years’ confinement (rather than the 40 recommended by the State). Weight given each sentencing factor is committed to the trial court’s discretion, ¶24; the sentencing court in this instance reached its conclusion only after weighing a number of sentencing factors,

Johnbull K. Osagiede v. USA, 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir 2009)

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s ignorance of rights available, under VCCR Art. 36, to her Nigerian national client was deficient:

Osagiede’s claim is a common one in Sixth Amendment cases. In essence, Osagiede argues that his lawyer should have been aware of his legal rights under Article 36 and should have acted to protect them: “All lawyers that represent criminal defendants are expected to know the laws applicable to their client’s defense.” Julian v.

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, PFR filed 3/6/09
Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding: Trial court refusal to allow Prineas to substitute one retained counsel for another absent “an extraordinary reason,” where substitution would necessitate continuance of the scheduled trial over objection of the complainant and her family, upheld as proper exercise of discretion; Carlson v. Jess,

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, PFR filed 3/6/09
Prineas: Raymond M. Dall’osto, Kathryn A. Keppel

Issue/Holding:

¶14      In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel derived from the Sixth Amendment includes “the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” Id.

State v. Jason L. McClaren, 2009 WI 60, reversing 2008 WI App 118
For McClaren: Michael C. Witt

Issue/Holding:

¶21      It is well established that a defendant seeking to support a self-defense claim may attempt to “prov[e] prior specific instances of violence within [the defendant’s] knowledge at the time of the incident.”  State v. Wenger, 225 Wis.