On Point

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding: Though merely incidental to robbery, kidnapping charge is supported on theory that ordering the victim to relinquish property holds that person to service against his or her will:

¶26      … The defendants contend that,

State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶52   We conclude as a matter of law that shooting a person in the thigh at a range of sixteen feet with a shotgun is practically certain to cause at least a protracted loss or impairment of the function of the person’s leg, and is therefore injury constituting “great bodily harm” within the meaning of the statutes.

State v. Dione Wendell Haywood, 2009 WI App 178
For Haywood: Robert E. Haney

Issue/Holding: In a battery-to-officer prosecution, it is no defense that the officer refused to leave the premises when the resident withdrew consent to enter, because acting “lawfully” is not an element:

¶11      The flaw in Haywood’s contention, however, is that a law-enforcement officer need not be acting “lawfully” for what he or she does to be done in the officer’s “official capacity.”  Rather,

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether use of force element of second-degree sexual assault was established where the defendant asked the complainant to rate his penis then hugged her so that she could feel his penis through their clothing.

Holding:

¶24      Long’s arguments are not persuasive.

State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Miller incontrovertibly had some basis to fire a shotgun at his drunken, violent antagonist and even if not adequate to establish full self-defense was enough to defeat the reckless injury element of utter disregard for human life, thereby requiring entry of judgment of acquittal on remand, ¶¶31-44.

Lengthy clips from the court’s detailed analysis omitted,

State v. Elliot B. Russ, Sr., 2009 WI App 68
For Russ: Barry S. Buckspan

Issue/Holding: No expectation of privacy protected papers left in courthouse hallway and subsequently seized and photocopied by court personnel:

¶12   Although Russ’s main brief on this appeal asserts that, as testified-to by Carlson, the affidavits were in a folder when Carlson saw them, the circuit court found that when Commissioner Sweet first saw them they “were spread out on a public bench” … .

State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House

Issue/Holding:

¶11      Wisconsin Stat. § 940.32 creates three distinct classifications of stalking offenses. See State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶24, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557. Subsections (2) and (2e) each set forth separate requirements for Class I felony stalking.

State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House

Issue/Holding:

¶19      We conclude that the seven year time restriction specified in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) requires that only the final act charged as part of a course of conduct occur within seven years of the previous conviction, and does not restrict by time the other acts used to establish the underlying course of conduct element of sub.

State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Prior conviction for a violent crime is element, not penalty enhancer, of stalking, §§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a):

¶30      First, sub. (2m)(a) designates a list of specific crimes that elevate a simple stalking offense to a Class H felony. These enumerated prior convictions are for a specific set of violent crimes,

State v. Elliot B. Russ, Sr., 2009 WI App 68
For Russ: Barry S. Buckspan

Issue/Holding:

¶11   The first issue turns on whether Russ had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the affidavits that he left on the bench. See Roberts, 196 Wis.  2d at 453, 538 N.W.2d at 828 (“[B]efore a defendant can invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment,