On Point

State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Evidence related to a penalty enhancer (such as a prior conviction in support of habitual criminality) is relevant only to sentence and “must be withheld from the jury’s knowledge,” ¶19, quoting Mulkovich v. State, 73 Wis.  2d 464,

State v. Charles Lamar, 2009 WI App 133, PFR filed 9/10/09
For Lamar: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: No presumption of vindictiveness applied to resentencing by a different judge upon guilty pleas re-entered after the original trial court granted Lamar’s postconviction motion to withdraw the initial guilty pleas.

¶17      In Naydihor, our supreme court found that the Pearce presumption did not apply.

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: The “3-strike” persistent repeater enhancement, § 939.62(2m)(d), requires that the two prior strikes occur before the current felony and the 1st strike’s conviction date precede the 2nd strike’s violation date. Although Long’s two prior strikes occurred before the current felony,

State v. Lord L. Sturdivant, 2009 WI App 5, PFR filed 1/13/09
For Sturdivant: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶8        Due process “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), 

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: First amendment analysis applies to an identity theft charge alleging that Baron sent emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation:

¶16      In order to determine if a First Amendment analysis is required, we must first consider whether conduct alone or speech,

State v. Terion Lamar Robinson, 2009 WI App 97
For Robinson: Beth A. Eisendrath

Issue/Holding: Given the trial court finding that Robinson either lived or stayed at the apartment, the police were authorized to enter to effectuate his arrest under auspices of an arrest warrant:

¶16      In Blanco, the police, who had an arrest warrant for Blanco, entered an apartment where they believed Blanco was staying. 

State v. Jeremy D. Schladweiler, 2009 WI App 177
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Commonly referred to as “boot camp,” the CIP is governed by Wis. Stat. § 302.045, which provides that “the [DOC] shall provide a challenge incarceration program for inmates selected to participate” after meeting the eligibility requirements for the program. Sec. 302.045(1). …

¶10      Once the trial court has made an eligibility determination,

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: A search warrant for seizure of the sorts of items Sveum used or kept in connection with a 1996 stalking conviction established probable cause he was keeping such items in 2003:

¶35      The warrant affidavit stated that the affiant was a detective with twenty-two years of experience who had specialized training in stalking crimes. 

State v. Jaime Romero, 2009 WI 32, reversing unpublished opinion
For Romero: Thomas E. Hayes

Issue/Holding: Search warrant affidavit, based in part on incriminatory statements of “unwitting” informant (“Mr. X”), established probable cause:

¶29      In the instant case a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer what someone else had told him.  In such a case, the veracity of each person in the chain is relevant. 

State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2009 WI App 81, affirmed on other grounds, 2010 WI 92
For Sveum: Robert J. Kaiser, Jr.

Issue/Holding: 

¶40      Sveum’s particularity argument is that the many items authorized for seizure were so “non-specific” that the warrant was an invalid general warrant. Police were authorized to seize phone bills, journals, calendars, logs, computers and devices related to computers,