On Point

State v. Antonio K. Phillips, 2009 WI App 179, PFR filed 11/25/09
For Phillips: Michael J. Backes

Issue/Holding:

¶8        There are four exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless search: “(1) an arrest made in ‘hot pursuit,’ (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee.” State v.

State v. Kevin Raphael Lee, 2009 WI App 96, PFR filed 7/1/09
For Lee: Robert E. Haney

Issue/Holding: Warrantless entry of residence is supported when the State demonstrates both probable cause and exigent circumstances, ¶7. Exigent circumstances include: (1) hot pursuit of suspect; (2) threat to someone’s safety; (3) risk of evidence destruction; and (4) likelihood suspect will flee, ¶9.

The court goes on to collapse the 2nd and 3rd categories of exigencies,

State v. Mitchell A. Lange, 2009 WI 49, reversing unpublished opinion
For Lange: Steven M. Cohen

Issue/Holding:

¶2       We are asked to determine whether a law enforcement officer complied with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when obtaining a blood sample from the defendant without a warrant to do so. Our prior cases establish that a warrantless blood sample taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer is consistent with the Fourth Amendment under the following circumstances: “(1) the blood draw is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving related violation or crime,

State v. Brian K. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107
For Goodson: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Objective bias can exist in two situations. The first is where there is the appearance of bias, Gudgeon, 295 Wis. 2d 189, ¶¶23-24. “[T]he appearance of bias offends constitutional due process principles whenever a reasonable person—taking into consideration human psychological tendencies and weaknesses—concludes that the average judge could not be trusted to ‘hold the balance nice,

State v. Brian K. Goodson, 2009 WI App 107
For Goodson: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The reconfinement judge should have recused himself, given that at original disposition he threatened to impose the maximum if the defendant was returned to court on revocation; State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, deemed controlling:

¶12      The same analysis applies here.

State v. Todd W. Berggren, 2009 WI App 82, PFR filed 6/24/09
For Berggren: Robert G. LeBell

Issue/Holding1: Viewing of memory stick, concededly obtained in “private” search not covered by 4th amendment, ¶13 n. 6, by off-duty police lieutenant who was defendant’s brother-in-law, was not a “government search”:

¶14      “Private searches are not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s protections because the Fourth Amendment applies only to government action.” State v.

State v. Paul Anthony Butler, 2009 WI App 52, PFR filed 4/20/09
For Butler: Trisha R. Stewart Martin

Issue/Holding: Seizure and detention by security guard, until police arrived to conduct search, didn’t amount to government action so as to trigger 4th amendment analysis, under 3-factor test of State v. Tomas Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47:

¶14      As we see from Butler’s submissions that are in the Record,

State v. William Allen Wisth, 2009 WI App 53, PFR filed 4/29/09
For Wisth: Jeremy Perri, SPD, MilwaukeeAppellate

Issue/Holding: Defendant not entitled to request substitution of judge assigned to sentencing following revocation; § 971.20(5) is limited to pre-guilt phases:

¶14   We conclude that the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.20(5) is that substitution is permitted only prior to trial. When the issue of guilt or lack of guilt is resolved,

State v. Colin G. Schloegel, 2009 WI App 85
For Schloegel: Sarvan Singh

Issue/Holding1: School grounds are extended to the school parking lot, so that the test for searches of students, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), applies to search of a student’s car parked in the lot, ¶¶15-19.

Issue/Holding2: Search of student’s car in school parking lot was reasonable:

¶21      In this case,

State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161
For Patterson: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding:

¶29      We will assume, for purposes of Patterson’s argument, that the definition of “juvenile” in Wis. Stat. § 938.02 applies for purposes of defining “delinquency” in Wis. Stat. § 948.40. Nonetheless, Patterson’s statutory analysis ignores the fact that a seventeen-year-old is only excepted from the definition of “juvenile” for a single purpose,