On Point

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding:

¶11      The State submits that the computer-generated animation was intended as a demonstrative exhibit. The decision to admit or exclude demonstrative evidence is committed to the trial court’s discretion. [6] State v.

State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: On a trial for stalking, § 940.32, where one of the elements is prior conviction for “violent crime,” the defendant may blunt prejudicial impact of proof of the prior by stipulating to the existence of the conviction for a violent crime (thus precluding proof of its details);

State v. Benjamin D. Tarrant, 2009 WI App 121
For Tarrant: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶6        Waiver. Before addressing the merits, the State argues that Tarrant’s no contest plea constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶54, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.

State v. Chase E. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117
For Kaczmarski: Harold L. Harlowe, David M. Gorwitz

Issue/Holding:

¶10      Both the State and Kaczmarski agree that the deferred prosecution agreement is analogous to a contract and therefore we draw upon principles of contract law in determining the respective rights of the parties to the agreement. See State v. Roou, 2007 WI App 193,

State v. Chase E. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117
For Kaczmarski: Harold L. Harlowe, David M. Gorwitz

Issue: Whether commission of an offense during the period of the deferred prosecution agreement permitted resumption of the prosecution after that period expired, under the wording of the agreement.

Holding:

¶13      We conclude that the deferred prosecution agreement unambiguously provides that, in the event that Kaczmarski breaches the agreement,

State v. Richard L. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, PFR filed 8/4/09
For Wesley: Alvin Ugent

Issue/Holding: A plea agreement under which the State dismissed one count “outright” and “(b)oth sides are free to argue” was ambiguous as to whether to State could argue the facts underlying the dismissed charge at sentencing:

¶17      We thus conclude that the plea bargain was ambiguous because the agreement could have meant the State would either (1) dismiss the charges outright,

State v. Christopher S. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, affirming 2008 WI App 89
For Hoppe: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A court may incorporate a plea questionnaire form into the guilty plea colloquy, but only up to a point:

 ¶32     The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights Form provides a defendant and counsel the opportunity to review together a written statement of the information a defendant should know before entering a guilty plea.

State v. Richard L. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, PFR filed 8/4/09
For Wesley: Alvin Ugent

Issue/Holding:

¶12      The interpretation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law. See State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945. Contractual language is ambiguous only when it is “reasonably or fairly susceptible of more than one construction.” State v.

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding: Lay witness, who testified to computer-generated animation that attempted to recreate the alleged crime through the eyes of certain witnesses, lacked personal knowledge to undertake this effort:

¶16      As a lay witness,

State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161
For Patterson: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding:

¶35      The first three alleged instances of misconduct are similar. In each instance, the prosecutor sought to demonstrate the possible unreliability of one witness’s recollection by using seemingly inconsistent recollections of another witness. For example, in one instance the prosecutor asked: “So if all other witnesses said that at 11:00 your mom was already home … that would be wrong?” We see no Haseltine problem with these three instances because the prosecutor was not asking a witness to opine as to whether another witness was telling the truth.¶36      The fourth alleged instance does appear to have involved a Haseltineviolation.