On Point

State v. Aaron E. Applewhite, 2008 WI App 138, PFR filed 9/19/08
For Applewhite: Pamela Moorshead

Issue/Holding: Reasonable suspicion supported the frisk, given: the type of crime being investigated (residential burglary); the suspect’s admitted possession of, but initial reluctance to produce, two knives; and, his repeated reaching into his pants pockets, ¶¶3-11.

State v. Nathaniel L. Sumner, 2008 WI 94, reversing unpublished opinion
For Sumner: Craig Albee, Carol S. Josten

Issue/Holding:

¶23      Our protective search or “frisk” jurisprudence has consistently emphasized that the totality of all circumstances present and known to the officer must be taken into account to assess the legality of the procedure. Naturally, some factors will be of greater import than others in the reasonable suspicion calculus in a particular case.

State v. Clemente Lamont Alexander, 2008 WI App 9
For Alexander: Michael C. Demo

Issue: Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to search the glove compartment of a car, stopped for a minor traffic violation (right turn on red without stopping), based on multiple factors: delay in pulling over, furtive movements, high-crime area, and post-stop observation of items on the driver seat normally found in the glove compartment.

State v. Tamara C. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, PFR filed 5/7/08
For Limon: Wm. Tyroler, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Lisa A. Packard, Law Student

Issue/Holding1:

¶17      The investigative stop stemmed from an anonymous citizen’s tip of drug use and loitering on the porch of the residence. … Where an anonymous tipster is involved, police are required to conduct an independent investigation to corroborate the information provided.

State v. Ramon Lopez Arias, 2008 WI 84, on Certification
For Arias: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison

Issue: whether extending a routine traffic stop by 78 seconds so that a dog could perform (without reasonable suspicion) a “drug sniff” amounted to an unlawful seizure.

Holding:

¶34      … . There remains no hard-and-fast time limit for when a detention has become too long and therefore becomes unreasonable. 

State v. Sean R. Fox, 2008 WI App 136
For Fox: Daniel M. Berkos

Issue/Holding: Permissive guest who had not stayed overnight lacked expectation of privacy in a mobile home:

¶21      The facts of this case contrast with those of Trecroci and more closely resemble those of Carter. Fox’s relationship to his hosts, Terry and McCoy,

State v. Alexander Caleb Grunke / State v. Dustin Blake Radke, 2008 WI 82, reversing 2007 WI App 198
For Grunke: Suzanne Edwards
For Radke: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether § 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim.

State v. Brian Harold Duchow,  2008 WI 57, reversing  unpublished decision
For Duchow: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding

¶21 This second component reflects that protections from unreasonable searches and seizures, as described in the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution [15] as well as Article I, § 11 of the state constitution, [16] must be determined by reference to the “‘scope of privacy that a free people legitimately may expect.’” 

State v. Kevin M. Champlain, 2008 WI App 5, (AG’s) PFR filed 1/4/08
For Champlain: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶37      Owner nonconsent, like other elements of criminal offenses, may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Bohachef v. State, 50 Wis.  2d 694, 700-01, 185 N.W.2d 339 (1971). The test on review is whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,

State v. Carmen L. Doss, 2008 WI 93, reversing 2007 WI App 208
For Doss: Robert R. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶57      Next, we address Doss’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction under Wisconsin Statute § 943.20(1)(b). Doss correctly recites the elements the State was required to establish to obtain a conviction: that (1) she had possession of money as a result of her position as a personal representative of her father’s estate;