On Point

State v. Kenneth W. Lippold, 2008 WI App 130, PFR filed 8/18/08
For Lippold: Thomas J. Nitschke

Issue/Holding: On a charge of receiving stolen property, venue may rest in the county where the underlying theft occurred (and, provable by circumstantial rather than direct evidence):

¶16   Extrapolating from the holding in Swinson, we conclude that because the crime of receiving stolen property requires more than two acts,

State v. Travis S. Dewitt, 2008 WI App 134, PFR filed 8/19/08
For Dewitt: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether someone simultaneously held under personal recognizance and cash bonds can be guilty of bail jumping for acts committed in the jail.

Holding:

 ¶12      … Wis. Stat. § 946.49 provides that someone who “having been released from custody under [Wis.

State v. Eric T. Olson, 2008 WI App 171
For Olson: Byron C. Lichstein

Issue/Holding: The “act other than element” of § 948.075(3) isn’t satisfied by either transmission of live video of the shirtless defendant, or by his prior sexual encounters with others he met on-line:

¶11      Accordingly, we read the statute to require that, before the State may obtain a conviction under WIS. STAT.

State v. Lawrence Payette, 2008 WI App 106, PFR filed 6/30/08
For Payette: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro

Issue/Holding: Providing cocaine to a minor in exchange for sex supported plea-based conviction for enticement within § 948.07(6), ¶23.

State v. Lawrence Payette, 2008 WI App 106, PFR filed 6/30/08
For Payette: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro

Issue: Whether repeated “dope dating” (giving a minor cocaine on multiple occasions in exchange for sex) amounts to causing the child to practice prostitution within the meaning of § 948.08.

Holding1: “Practice” prostitution:

¶15      Payette is charged with violating Wis. Stat. § 948.08,

State v. Jason K. Van Buren, 2008 WI App 26, PFR filed 1/23/08
For Van Buren: Waring R. Fincke

Issue/Holding: Possession of child pornography, § 948.12(1m), requires depiction of real, as opposed to “virtual,” children:

¶6        … Wisconsin Stat. § 948.12(1m) (2005-06) [1] criminalizes the knowing possession of any “photograph … of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” To be convicted under this statute,

State v. Jason K. Van Buren, 2008 WI App 26, PFR filed 1/23/08
For Van Buren: Waring R. Fincke

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s failure to request a specific unanimity instruction with respect to juror agreement on which of the identified pictures was both harmful and shown to the victim was not prejudicial:

¶22      We reject this claim because Van Buren has not demonstrated the prejudice necessary to show ineffective assistance of counsel.

State v. Tanya L. Marten-Hoye, 2008 WI App 19, (AG’s) PFR filed 2/20/08; prior history: Certification, rejected 9/10/07
For Marten-Hoye: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶31      Wisconsin Stat. § 947.01 prohibits “violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.” Ben-Ami observed Marten-Hoye walking away from Ben-Ami and using profane language in a loud voice.

Waukesha County v. Eric D. Smith, 2008 WI 23, affirming unpublished decision
For Smith: Kirk B. Obear

Issue/Holding:

¶36 We conclude that under the circumstances of the present case, the Deputy’s knowledge at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

State v. Dwight M. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, affirming as modified, 2007 WI App 174
For Sanders: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant had already been removed from the premises following his arrest, a search of his bedroom couldn’t be justified under a search-incident rationale:

¶51      The State contends that Officer Garcia’s second search of the defendant’s bedroom was justified as a search incident to arrest under the Chimel standard because the bedroom was “within [the defendant’s] immediate presence or control when he barricaded himself in the bedroom and was out of the police officers’