On Point

State v. Andrae D. Howell, 2007 WI 75, reversing 2006 WI App 182
For Howell: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s understanding of the charge must be detailed, in anon-perfunctory manner, on the record of the guilty plea:

¶52      The circuit court did not establish Howell’s understanding of the information it relayed to Howell by personally questioning him. Rather than asking Howell to summarize his understanding,

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶54      We agree with the State’s position that Price’s out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. In talking to Officer Langendorf, Price was describing a startling event——his encounter with Mayo, during which he claimed that he was robbed and battered.

State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶27 n. 7:

This court explained the procedure for read-in charges in Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971). When charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant admits to having committed the underlying crimes, but does not plead guilty to the charges,

State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: In order to trigger read-in procedure there must be a sufficient showing of an agreement to read in the offense at issue:

¶28      Nowhere in the transcript of the plea hearing, the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the transcript of the adjourned sentencing hearing,

State v. William Troy Ford, 2007 WI 138, affirming unpublished decision
For Ford: Ralph J. Sczygelski

Issue/Holding: A surveillance tape that became unplayable was “destroyed” within the meaning of § 910.04(1), and its contents could be testified to by pre-destruction viewers:

¶68 We are satisfied that where a tape is damaged and unplayable, the proponent of the evidence makes reasonable efforts to restore the tape to playability,

State v. Edward Bannister, 2007 WI 86, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892, reversing 2006 WI App 136

Issue/Holding: Bannister’s confession to giving morphine to someone who died from an overdose of the substance was sufficiently corroborated to support his his conviction:

¶ 22 We first address whether the State satisfied the corroboration rule during the course of Bannister’s trial. The corroboration rule is a common-law standard.

State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding:

¶38      We agree with the State’s assertion that cases from other jurisdictions are not binding on Wisconsin courts. State ex rel. E.R. v. Flynn, 88 Wis. 2d 37, 46, 276 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1979). We recognize that such case law is oftentimes helpful,

Oneida Co. DSS v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, affirming unpublished decision

Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order was based on her default for failing to personally appear at the fact-finding hearing.

Holding:

¶27 We agree with the court of appeals that to require more evidence than a prior involuntary termination order to satisfy Wis.

Oneida Co. DSS v. Nicole W., 2007 WI 30, affirming unpublished decision

Issue: Whether partial summary judgment against Nicole was properly granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10) (prior involuntary TPR within 3 years) when the prior termination order did not state the explicit § 48.415 ground relied on.

Holding:

¶2 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10)(b) does not require proof of which § 48.415 ground was relied upon for a prior termination of parental rights because the phrase,

Dane co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4 court of appeals, 3/29/07 (published)

Issue/Holding:

¶19 Dyanne acknowledges that the CHIPS order makes reference to “warnings” and contains the statutory language defining the possible grounds for termination. She also does not dispute that the order contains the conditions that were necessary for Artavia’s return. Dyanne’s argument is limited to an assertion that the order fails to sufficiently connect the warning language to the statutory language.