On Point

Dane Co. DHS v. Dyanne M., 2007 WI App 129, District 4, 3/29/07 (published)

Competency of TPR Court – Statutory Time Limits, Generally

Issue/Holding:1: Generally, compliance with a statutory TPR time limit is mandatory, such that non-compliance results in lost circuit court competency absent an applicable exception, ¶5, citing Dane Co. DHS v. Susan P.S., 2006 WI App 100, ¶63.

Issue/Holding:2: The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of lost judicial competency for lapse of a time limit without obtaining a proper extension under § 48.315,

State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, reversing a summary order remanding the case to the court of appeals.

Issue/Holding:

¶5 For the reasons set forth, we hold that in determining whether a party seeking termination of parental rights has proven by clear and convincing evidence that a biological father has failed to assume parental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), a circuit court must consider the biological father’s efforts undertaken after he discovers that he is the father but before the circuit court adjudicates the grounds of the termination proceeding.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: The trial court properly exercised discretion in terminating rights:

¶25 Teodoro finally argues that at the dispositional stage, the trial court erroneously determined that termination of his parental rights would be in the best interests of the children. This determination is committed to the circuit court’s discretion, and will not be overturned unless that discretion is erroneously exercised.

Waukesha Co. DHHS v. Teodoro E., 2008 WI App 16, District 2 (published)

Issue/Holding: Conditions imposed for non-termination of a deported parent’s children weren’t impossible, notwithstanding parent’s inability to return to country:

¶23 But as the circuit court noted, “Mexico is not prison” and Teodoro remained free to work on and meet many of the conditions of return. As an example, the first condition,

Allen A. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir 2005)

Issue/Holding: AEDPA requirement of state court adjudication on merits requires neither “well-articulated or even correct decision”; state court need not offer any reasons, so that summary disposition would satisfy requirement. In short: it “is perhaps best understood by stating what it is not: it is not the resolution of a claim on procedural grounds.”

Followed: Joseph M.

State v. Thomas S. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, affirming unpublished opinion
For Mayo: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶46      We agree with Mayo’s position, and the State’s concession at oral argument, that the prosecutor’s remarks on Mayo’s pre-Miranda silence, and the testimony she elicited in that regard, during the State’s opening statement and case-in-chief, violated Mayo’s right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

State v. Jeffrey L. Torkelson, 2007 WI App 272, PFR filed 11/30/07
For Torkelson: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: Custody, for purposes of Miranda, requires that the suspect’s freedom be restricted to a degree associated with formal arrest, and is as gauged by a multi-factor test articulated in State v. Zan Morgan, 2002 WI App 124, ¶¶13-14. None of those factors are present in this instance,

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding:

¶35   The circuit court relied on statements Markwardt made one hour and eleven minutes into the interview for its ruling that she had properly asserted her right to remain silent. Her exact words were: “Then put me in jail. Just get me out of here.

State v. Heather A. Markwardt, 2007 WI App 242, PFR filed 11/29/07
For Markwardt: Richard Hahn

Issue/Holding: Markwardt’s in-custody statement was voluntary: any stress she was under was “unrelated to police conduct” (¶37); she didn’t unequivocally assert her rights (¶40); that the interrogator “was at times confrontational and raised his voice is not improper police procedure and does not, by itself, establish police coercion” (¶42,

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
Issue/Holding:

¶23      Applying the plain language of the rule, Gorokhovsky’s certification of compliance is false. His appendix contains only a copy of the judgment of conviction, the notice of motion and motion to suppress, and the notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief. How these documents in any way inform this court about the trial court’s determinations “essential to an understanding of the issues raised,” we do not know.