On Point

State v. David M. Larsen, 2007 WI App 147, PFR filed 5/31/07
For Larsen: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20 Larsen first contends that because the officers had already conducted a thorough search of the home, they had no reason to believe that there was anyone inside in need of immediate assistance. We disagree.

¶21 When the officers and emergency personnel conducted the first search,

State v. Roemie T. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, PFR filed 9/27/07
For St. Germaine: Rex Anderegg

Issue: Whether the owner of the residence (Briseno) had apparent authority to consent to police search of renter St. Germaine’s room, at least where St. Germaine was present was consent was sought and never objected.

Holding:

¶17 St. Germaine argues that there was no reasonable basis for the officers to search his room because they knew it was rented and that Briseno could not consent.

State v. John J. Hartwig, 2007 WI App 160, PFR filed 5/22/07
For Hartwig: Wright C. Laufenberg

Issue/Holding: The trial court misread State v. Reginald Jones, 2005 WI App 26, to hold that consent to search is invalid whenever the person has been seized; rather, that case holds only that consent may be invalid when made following illegal seizure of the person.

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Issue/Holding:

¶18      The State has satisfied its burden to show the consent was voluntary. There is no suggestion of misrepresentation, deception, trickery or intimidation. The officers did not use weapons or force or otherwise take custody of Bons. Bons testified that Ramstack told him that he could be arrested,

State v. Dwight M. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, affirmed on different ground, 2008 WI 85
For Sanders: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: To overcome its presumptive prohibition, warrantless entry of a residence must be supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances (the latter including hot pursuit, threat to safety, risk of destroyed evidence, and likelihood of flight), ¶¶10-13.

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶16      When the purported legality of a warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).

State v. Isaiah Bowden, 2007 WI App 234
For Bowden: Jason R. Farris

Issue/Holding: Conviction for interference with custody, § 948.31(2), doesn’t require that the child be within the parent’s immediate presence or control:

¶18   The State posits that the withholding method of interference focuses on permission, not being in the parent’s presence. We agree. The withholding method addresses a situation where the person who takes the child has some initial permission to do so.

State v. Christopher D. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146
For Sloan: Thomas E. Hayes

Issue/Holding: Inspection of package by UPS personnel and subsequent disclosure of its contents to police didn’t require a warrant, because of lack of governmental involvement in the initial search.

¶10 A private party’s discovery, and subsequent disclosure to law enforcement, of contraband is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment where there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in dealings with the private party. 

Michael Allen Lambert v. Buss, 489 F.3d 779 (Nos. 03-1015 & 05-2610, 6/12/07)

Issue/Holding: A motion to recall the mandate is subject to successive-petition restrictions.

State ex rel. Steven M. Rupinski v. Smith, 2007 WI App 4
For Rupinski: Daniel R. Drigot

Issue/Holding: ¶12 n. 3:

The State challenges the venue of Milwaukee County as improper because Rupinski is confined at the Oshkosh Correctional Institution located in Winnebago County. The State argues that, as a result, the writ was improperly filed under Wis. Stat. § 801.50(4).  The proper venue for writ of habeas corpus shall be in the county “[w]here the plaintiff was convicted or sentenced if the action seeks relief from a judgment of conviction or sentence under which the plaintiff’s liberty is restrained” or “[w]here the liberty of the plaintiff is restrained if the action seeks relief concerning any other matter relating to a restraint on the liberty of the plaintiff.” Wis.