On Point

State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding: On a trial of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, § 940.09(1)(b), where the defense was that the death would have occurred anyway because the deceased grabbed the wheel just prior to the accident, evidence that the deceased “had, on prior occasions, gestured as if to grab the steering wheel of his father’s vehicle and,

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32 Bruski argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case, even if he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith’s vehicle. The question of whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.

State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi

Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:

¶2      A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. 

State v. Dwight M. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, affirmed on different ground, 2008 WI 85
For Sanders: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32 In both Hughes and Garrett, the police officers actually detected the presence of drugs within the residence before they entered without a warrant. In Hughes, the officers smelled the “unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from [the defendant’s] apartment.” Hughes,

State v. Dale C. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31
For Ploeckelman: Rand Krueger

Issue/Holding:

¶17   Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) prohibits a type of fraud, which is addressed by both criminal and civil tort law. See State v. Timblin, 2002 WI App 304, ¶31, 259 Wis. 2d 299, 657 N.W.2d 89. While there are no common law crimes, this court has consulted civil tort law as an aid to interpreting the criminal fraud statutes.

State v. Dale C. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31
For Ploeckelman: Rand Krueger

Issue/Holding:

¶18   A representation can be acts or conduct. See Stecher v. State, 168 Wis. 183, 186, 169 N.W. 287 (1918). In Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205, our supreme court laid out the circumstances where a failure to disclose can constitute a representation.

State v. David M. Larsen, 2007 WI App 147, PFR filed 5/31/07
For Larsen: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18 The parties express some confusion over whether an officer’s subjective motivations are relevant in determining whether his or her actions violate the Fourth Amendment in emergency doctrine matters. Recent cases from our supreme court and the United States Supreme Court clarify that whether a warrantless home entry is justified based on the need to render assistance or prevent harm is judged by an objective test. 

State v. David Richard Turnpaugh, 2007 WI App 222
For Turnpaugh: David P. Geraghty, Michael Sosnay

Issue: Given that, as charged, the offense required soliciting “sexual intercourse” (which in turn is defined as “vulvar penetration”), whether the statement “that he was looking for sex and he wanted me to masturbate and that he wanted to watch” is sufficient to support conviction.

Holding:

¶7        Although Turnpaugh said he was “looking for sex,” he limited the scope of that phrase by describing >what he was willing to pay for—watching Ferguson masturbate.

State v. David Richard Turnpaugh, 2007 WI App 222
For Turnpaugh: David P. Geraghty, Michael Sosnay

Issue/Holding: Reversal of the conviction for the crime on which the bail-jumping “was premised” also requires reversal of the bail-jumping conviction, ¶8.

This isn’t to say that bail-jumping requires >conviction on the underlying offense, see, e.g., State v. Kelley L. Hauk, 2002 WI App 226,

State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶29      Lackershire’s second argument centers on the somewhat unique posture of this case. A violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is generally viewed as a strict liability offense. Unlike other sexual assault offenses, where consent of the victim may be a central issue,