On Point

State v. Lamont D. Powell, 2007 WI App 127
For Powell: Nicholas C. Zales

Issue/Holding:

¶3        The sixty-day limit in Wis. Stat. § 961.555(2)(b) is mandatory and a forfeiture petition must be dismissed unless the requisite hearing is held within the sixty-day period because a person may not be deprived of his or her property “for an indefinite time” without a prompt judicial assessment of whether forfeiture is justified. 

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Issue: Whether a concededly proper traffic stop (for speeding) was extended without sufficient cause when the officer, after issuing the ticket and returning the license, asked to search the car.

Holding:

¶15  We conclude that Ramstack could have formed a reasonable suspicion that Bons was engaged in illegal activity,

State v. Frank C. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, PFR filed 11/8/07; prior history: Certification, 8/8/07, denied, 9/10/07
For Newer: Francis R. Lettenberger

Issue/Holding: The police have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle whose owner’s DL is known to have been revoked, given no reason to think someone other than the owner is behind the wheel:

¶2    We now reverse the circuit court’s suppression of the evidence and remand for further proceedings.

State v. Frank C. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, PFR filed 11/8/07; prior history: Certification, 8/8/07, denied, 9/10/07
For Newer: Francis R. Lettenberger

Issue/Holding: ¶4, n. 2.

The circuit court also refused to consider the alternative grounds of the observed speeding violation because the officer “wasn’t using that as a basis for the stop.” We note that the officer’s subjective motivation for making a stop is not the issue;

State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi

Issue/Holding: Dismissal of an appeal as having been directed to a non-final order doesn’t in and of itself bar the court of appeals from deciding to grant leave to appeal, ¶7 n. 2:

In its jurisdictional memoranda, the State asks us to construe its notice of appeal as a petition for leave to appeal in the event that we decline jurisdiction over the appeal. 

State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi

Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:

¶2      A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.  

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶34      Turning to the present case, the State contends that Johnson’s movement in the interior of the car was a sufficiently compelling factor to justify Stillman’s protective search of Johnson’s car. The State asserts that the court of appeals improperly concluded this single factor,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶45      Another factor weighs strongly against the reasonableness of the protective search in this case. Before Johnson was asked to exit the vehicle and submit to a pat down, he gave Stillman paperwork showing that his vehicle had passed an emissions test recently,

State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen

Issue/Holding: On a trial of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, § 940.09(1)(b), where the defense was that the death would have occurred anyway because the deceased grabbed the wheel just prior to the accident, evidence that the deceased “had, on prior occasions, gestured as if to grab the steering wheel of his father’s vehicle and,

State v. David Allen Bruski, 2007 WI 25, affirming 2006 WI App 53
For Bruski: Margaret A. Maroney, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32 Bruski argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his travel case, even if he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Ms. Smith’s vehicle. The question of whether an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property found inside a vehicle that he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.