On Point

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

¶57      The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not appearing personally. We can quickly dismiss this argument. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary. As we determined in M.W.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

Issue/Holding: ¶13 n. 3:

The circuit court did not order a default under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5). Shirley E. had “appeared” at the hearing by her attorney. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis.  2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.The circuit court found Shirley E.

Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order

Issue: Whether finding of parental unfitness in a TPR, grounded on a condition for the child’s return that was impossible to meet when imposed (namely that the parent set up a suitable residence within 12 months even though she was incarcerated and would not be released before then), violates substantive due process.

Holding:

¶49      Like the Nevada Supreme Court,

State v. Dale L. Smith, 2006 WI 74, affirming unpublished decision
For Smith: Allison Ritter

Issue/Holding:

¶16      The sole question we must address on appeal is whether Smith was denied the right to an impartial jury by the circuit court’s refusal to strikeCharlotte for cause. Smith argues that Charlotte should have been disqualified as objectively biased because she was employed by the prosecuting attorney.

State v. Charles W. Mark, 2006 WI 78, affirming 2005 WI App 62, 2005 WI App 62
For Mark: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether evidence of probation supervision was relevant to future dangerousness, and therefore should have been admitted into evidence.

Issue:

¶41      … (T)he plain language of Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7) makes the existence of a mental disorder—not any extrinsic factors—the first step in determining dangerousness and the substantial probability of the person engaging in future acts of sexual violence.

State v. Michael J. Parent, 2006 WI 132, on certification
For Parent: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Amicus: Meredith J. Ross & William E. Rosales
Issue/Holding:

¶17      Article I, Section 21(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) guarantee a person convicted of a crime in Wisconsin the right to appeal his or her conviction to the court of appeals.

State v. Michael J. Parent, 2006 WI 132, on certification
For Parent: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate
Amicus: Meredith J. Ross & William E. Rosales

Issue/Holding: (Procedure generally described, State v. Christopher G. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶17, quoted with approval, ¶¶18-23; see also ¶¶35-41, taking note of Wilkinson v. Cowan, 231 F.3d 347 (7th Cir.

State v. Michael J. Parent, 2006 WI 132, on certification
For Parent: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison
AppellateAmicus: Meredith J. Ross & William E. Rosales

Issue/Holding:

¶49      We conclude that the attorney general comes under the purview of Wis. Stat. § 972.15(4) and (4m) (2005-06) because, in criminal appeals, the attorney general is often the State’s successor to the district attorney. … We therefore conclude that under §§ 972.15 and 967.02(7) the attorney general’s office should submit any requests to obtain a copy of the PSI report and to disclose its contents in the State’s brief to the circuit court for the purposes of a no-merit appeal.

State v. Roger S. Walker, 2006 WI 82, affirming as modified summary order
For Walker: James Rebholz

Issue/Holding: In order to obtain review, a defendant must file a postconviction motion to modify sentence, even if the event was a re-sentencing which came to the same result as originally imposed.

¶37      In the hope of clarifying appellate procedure, we conclude that when a defendant seeks modification of the sentence imposed at resentencing,

State v. Rachel W. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, reversing unpublished decision
For Kelty: Michael J. Fairchild

Issue/Holding:

¶2     We are asked to decide whether an otherwise satisfactory guilty plea is sufficient to relinquish a double jeopardy/multiplicity challenge upon direct appeal. We conclude that a guilty plea relinquishes the right to assert a multiplicity claim when the claim cannot be resolved on the record.