On Point

State v. Walter William McCoy, 2007 WI App 15
For McCoy: Andrea Taylor Cornwall

Issue/Holding:

¶18   … We start by acknowledging that the chain of evidence in this case is not perfect. There are substantial time gaps as pointed out by McCoy. Nonetheless, the chain of custody evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that it was admissible. The standard for the admission of exhibits into evidence is that there must be a showing that the physical exhibit being offered is in substantially the same condition as when the crime was committed.”  Moore,

State v. Patrick Jackson, 2007 WI App 145, PFR filed 6/6/07
For Jackson: Marcella De Peters

Issue/Holding: On a prosecution for felon in possession of a firearm, based on the allegation that the defendant “handled” a gun in a gun store, evidence of a 3rd-party’s prior felony conviction was admissible, where: the identity of the person who touched the gun was disputed; and, the 3rd-party acknowledged in an extrajudicial statement,

State v. Thomas A. Nommensen, 2007 WI App 224
For Nommensen: Anthony L. O’Malley

Issue/Holding: Although charges of repeated sexual assault, § 948.025(1) were the same in law, they were different in fact because they :

¶8        Charged offenses are not multiplicitous if the facts are either separate in time or of a significantly different nature. Id. at 749. “The appropriate question is whether these acts allegedly committed … are so significantly different in fact that they may properly be denominated separate crimes although each would furnish a factual underpinning or a substitute legal element for the violation of the same statute.” Id.

State v. Scott R. Nelson, 2007 WI App 2, PFR filed 1/22/07
For Nelson: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding:

¶15      … Even under the “more likely than not” standard, there must be a strong nexus between the person’s mental disorder and that person’s level of dangerousness. Under this standard, the likelihood that the person will engage in an act of sexual violence is more than 50%. 

State v. Barry L. Smalley, 2007 WI App 219, PFR filed 10/19/07
For Smalley: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: State SVP expert’s unobjected-to misstatement of test for measuring reoffense risk (“more likely than not” means “any chance greater than zero” rather then more than 50%) didn’t support reversal in the interest of justice:

¶10      First, Dr. Jurek’s statement was an isolated occurrence in a three-day trial.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

 Issue: “(W)hether a circuit court may deny a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding the statutory right to counsel when the parent has appeared in the proceeding but failed to personally attend a hearing in contravention of a court order and is found in default as a sanction for disobeying the court order.” (¶2)

Holding:

¶41 We do not accept the State’s position for three reasons.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

¶57      The State also argues that Shirley E., a parent over 18 years of age, has waived her right to counsel by not appearing personally. We can quickly dismiss this argument. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.23(2) explicitly requires that any waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary. As we determined in M.W.

State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, affirming 2006 WI App 55

Issue/Holding: ¶13 n. 3:

The circuit court did not order a default under Wis. Stat. § 806.02(5). Shirley E. had “appeared” at the hearing by her attorney. Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis.  2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.The circuit court found Shirley E.

Kenosha Co. DHS v. Jodi W. 2006 WI 93, reversing summary order

Issue: Whether finding of parental unfitness in a TPR, grounded on a condition for the child’s return that was impossible to meet when imposed (namely that the parent set up a suitable residence within 12 months even though she was incarcerated and would not be released before then), violates substantive due process.

Holding:

¶49      Like the Nevada Supreme Court,

State v. Dale L. Smith, 2006 WI 74, affirming unpublished decision
For Smith: Allison Ritter

Issue/Holding:

¶16      The sole question we must address on appeal is whether Smith was denied the right to an impartial jury by the circuit court’s refusal to strikeCharlotte for cause. Smith argues that Charlotte should have been disqualified as objectively biased because she was employed by the prosecuting attorney.