On Point

State v. Chad W. Ziegler, 2006 WI App 49, PFR filed 3/13/06
For Ziegler: Kenneth P. Casey, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶23      The principal objectives of a sentence include, but are not limited to, the protection of the community, the punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. Id., ¶40. A sentencing court should indicate the general objectives of greatest importance and explain how,

State v. Germaine M. Taylor, 2006 WI 22, affirming unpublished summary order
For Taylor: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17        The standards governing appellate review of an imposed sentence are well settled. [9] A circuit court exercises its discretion at sentencing, and appellate review is limited to determining if the court’s discretion was erroneously exercised.

…

¶27      All told,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding:

¶47      Harvey correctly states Gallion’s teaching that probation should be considered as the first sentencing alternative. Gallion, 270 Wis.  2d 535, ¶25. Here, the trial court expressly addressed probation. … In sum, the court concluded that probation would unduly depreciate the offense. …

¶48      Probation should be the disposition unless confinement is necessary to protect the public,

State v. Donald Odom, 2006 WI App 145
For Odom: Eileen Miller Carter; J.C. Moore, SPD, Milwaukee Trial

Issue/Holding: Trial court’s discussion of the three primary sentencing factors was adequate, though the court did not explicitly identify those factors, ¶25.

State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14      This court observes a strong policy of deferring to the sentencing discretion of a trial court, presuming the sentence to be reasonable unless the defendant can demonstrate from the record that the court acted unreasonably. State v. Mosley, 201 Wis. 2d 36,

State v. Dion W. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Demmerly: Edward J. Hunt

Issue/Holding: A trial court may, but is not required to, override a defendant’s waiver of the right to conflict-free representation, and in this instance the trial court properly questioned the defendant and ascertained that he was knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right:

¶13 Contrary to Dion’s assertion,

State v. Carla L. Oglesby, 2006 WI App 95
For Oglesby: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶15      … [T]he trial court’s oral pronouncement imposed a two-year term of probation in 2004CM401. Despite this clear and unequivocal statement, the judgment of conviction recited a probation term of six years.

¶16      When an unambiguous oral pronouncement at sentencing conflicts with an equally unambiguous pronouncement in the judgment of conviction,

State v. Carla L. Oglesby, 2006 WI App 95
For Oglesby: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding: The test for statutory construction – whether the language is capable of being understood by reasonably informed persons in different ways – applies to determination of a sentencing court’s intent; where the parties staked out different sentencing positions but the sentencing court was silent as to whether multiple terms were to be concurrent or consecutive,

State v. Dion W. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Demmerly: Edward J. Hunt

Issue/Holding:

¶15 Dion contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel’s law firm also represented his co-defendant brother Douglas. … While there is no Wisconsin case law directly on point, the State cites federal cases holding that a defendant cannot assert ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest when the defendant validly waived the right to conflict-free representation.

State v. Dion W. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, PFR filed 9/11/06

For Demmerly: Edward J. Hunt

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s cross-examination of state’s witness testifying under a grant of immunity was adequate where it revealed that the witness’s motivation for testifying was a desire to receive leniency on his pending charges, ¶22; and, also where any confusion about the grant of immunity was clarified by the trial court’s accurate admonition to the jury on the matter,