On Point

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶39      Questions that call for a narrative are generally improper because they do not alert court and counsel to the subject about which the witness is about to testify. There are exceptions, however, and whether to permit a question calling for a narrative response is within the trial court’s discretion under Wis.

State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
Milanes: Joan M. Boyd

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s failure to litigate a (Miranda) suppression motion was not deficient where the issue turned purely on a credibility dispute between defendant and the detective and pursuit of the motion would have required rejecting a favorable offer, ¶¶15-16.

State v. Eric D. Cooks, 2006 WI App 262
For Cooks: Joseph E. Redding

Issue/Holding:

¶50      Cooks, as the trial court found, provided Barth with the names of alibi witnesses and Barth had Cooks testify to his alibi. However, Barth failed to investigate the potential alibi witnesses and argue Cooks’ alibi to the jury. Barth failed to do so despite the fact that a corroborated alibi clearly would have reinforced Barth’s misidentification theory of defense.

State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
For Milanes: Joan M. Boyd

Issue/Holding: Failure to pursue an NGI defense wasn’t deficient:

¶19      … The evidence in support of Milanes’ claim is remarkably weak; the strongest piece of evidence is the report of his psychiatric expert, which contains a conclusory statement that Milanes meets the statutory requirements. We will not discuss this issue in detail,

State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Because “recklessly” causing harm to a child, § 948.03(b), is determined solely from an objective point of view, evidence related to whether the actor “subjectively thought his [disciplinary action] was reasonable parental discipline” is irrelevant, including evidence of how the actor was him or herself disciplined as a child,

State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶23      At trial, Kramer asserted he acted in self-defense, and the jury was instructed on imperfect self-defense. A successful defense based on imperfect self-defense reduces first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide. [12] The test is subjective; a defendant must present “evidence of actual beliefs that [he] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force [he] used was necessary to defend [himself].”State v.

State v. Kevin J. Helsper, 2006 WI App 243
For Helsper: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20      Fines and attorney fee obligations involve different State purposes, and therefore a different constitutional analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of a fee recoupment statute, the court is to consider, among other things, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. 

State ex rel Marvin Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, reversing and remandingsummary order of court of appeals
For Coleman: Brian Kinstler

Issue/Holding:

¶28      Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party asserting laches: lack of knowledge (that the claim would be brought) and effect (prejudice).

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶14      The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:

    (1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: The § 346.67(1) requirement that a driver provide name, address, vehicle registration number, and driver’s license “to the person struck” does not violate the 5thamendment under controlling authority of California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 426 (1971), notwithstanding that the statute encompasses intentional conduct:

¶29      In short,