On Point

State v. Quentrell E. Williams, 2006 WI App 212
For Williams: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Because “recklessly” causing harm to a child, § 948.03(b), is determined solely from an objective point of view, evidence related to whether the actor “subjectively thought his [disciplinary action] was reasonable parental discipline” is irrelevant, including evidence of how the actor was him or herself disciplined as a child,

State v. Thomas G. Kramer, 2006 WI App 133, PFR filed 7/10
For Kramer: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶23      At trial, Kramer asserted he acted in self-defense, and the jury was instructed on imperfect self-defense. A successful defense based on imperfect self-defense reduces first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide. [12] The test is subjective; a defendant must present “evidence of actual beliefs that [he] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force [he] used was necessary to defend [himself].”State v.

State v. Kevin J. Helsper, 2006 WI App 243
For Helsper: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶20      Fines and attorney fee obligations involve different State purposes, and therefore a different constitutional analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of a fee recoupment statute, the court is to consider, among other things, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. 

State ex rel Marvin Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, reversing and remandingsummary order of court of appeals
For Coleman: Brian Kinstler

Issue/Holding:

¶28      Prihoda, Sawyer, Lohr and Schafer all employ a three-element test where the first element is unreasonable delay in bringing the claim and the other two elements apply to the party asserting laches: lack of knowledge (that the claim would be brought) and effect (prejudice).

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶14      The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:

    (1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: The § 346.67(1) requirement that a driver provide name, address, vehicle registration number, and driver’s license “to the person struck” does not violate the 5thamendment under controlling authority of California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 426 (1971), notwithstanding that the statute encompasses intentional conduct:

¶29      In short,

City of Sheboygan v. Steven Nytsch, 2006 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/11/06
For Nytsch: Chad A. Lanning

Issue: Whether a prior judicial review of a driver’s license suspension, overturning the administrative suspension, had a preclusive effect on the issue of probable cause to arrest for drunk driving in the subsequent prosecution for that offense.

Holding:

¶11 Thus, a threshold prerequisite for application of the doctrine is that,

Village of Cross Plains v. Kristin J. Haanstad, 2006 WI 16, reversing unpublished decision
For Haanstad: John M. Gerlach

Issue: Whether sitting in the driver’s seat of a running, parked car is, without more, “operating” a motor vehicle within § 346.63.

Holding:

¶15 The term “operate” is defined in § 346.63(3)(b), which reads: “‘Operate’” means the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”¶16 The court of appeals’

State v. Alvin M. Moore, 2006 WI App 61, PFR filed 3/21/06
For Moore: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶15      Charges are multiplicitous if they charge a single criminal offense in more than one count. State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992). Claims of multiplicity are analyzed using a two-prong test that requires examination of: (1) “whether the charged offenses are identical in law and fact;” and (2) if they are not,

State v. Jose M. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, PFR filed 5/11/06
For Jaimes: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding: Retrial is ordinarily not barred when the defendant successfully requests mistrial, except where prosecutorial overreaching, comprised of the following elements, has been shown: the prosecutor’s has “ a culpable state of mind in the nature of an awareness that his activity would be prejudicial to the defendant”;