On Point

Brown County v. Shannon R., 2005 WI 160, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue: Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion in precluding expert testimony on the issue of whether the TPR respondent is likely to be able to meet the conditions for return of her children.

Holding:

¶40      In deciding the issue of foundation, the circuit court seemed fixated on the psychological tests that Dr.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue Whether the State sufficiently proved grounds to support TPR such that the court should change the jury’s special verdict to the contrary.

Holding: “Because the record contains contradictory evidence and a key witness did not testify, and because it is possible the jury did not believe that the State proved the six-month period of abandonment, the trial court’s refusal to change the verdict answer or to grant a new trial was not ‘clearly wrong,’” ¶1.

State v. Lamont D., 2005 WI App 264

Issue/Holding:¶1 n. 4:

Lamont argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the guardian ad litem filed the notice of appeal and the State simply joined in the appeal instead of the other way around. We reject Lamont’s contention.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.235(7) plainly states that the guardian ad litem “may appeal,

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue/Holding:

¶2        Birth-parents “have constitutionally protected rights to raise their children as they see fit, and these rights may only be circumscribed if the government proves that there is a ‘powerful countervailing interest.’” Richard D. v. Rebecca G., 228 Wis. 2d 658, 661, 599 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoted sources and one internal quotation mark omitted).

State v. Lavelle W., 2005 WI App 266

Issue: Whether the right of a parent imprisoned  in the federal system to “meaningfully participate” in a TPR proceeding was violated when he was not physically produced in court but, instead, was limited to telephonic participation.

Holding: Where various mechanisms could have been utilized to produce the father yet weren’t attempted, and the telephone hook-up was, under the circumstances,

State v. Daniel D. King, 2005WI App 224
For King: Scott D. Obernberger

Issue/Holding: The confrontation clause requires that the hearsay declarant be unavailable to testify at trial “and, critically, that the State make a ‘good-faith effort’ to produce the declarant at trial,” ¶6. The trial court erred in determining that the declarant was truly unavailable:

¶16 First, the State conceded that its process-server had Shelia J.’s wrong address for seven of the attempts at service.

State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, reversing 2004 WI App 9
For Terrell C.J.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶58      … All custodial interrogation of juveniles in future cases shall be electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception when questioning occurs at a place of detention. Audiotaping is sufficient to satisfy our requirement; however, videotaping may provide an even more complete picture of what transpired during the interrogation. 

State v. Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, reversing 2004 WI App 9
For Terrell C.J.: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Juvenile Jerrell C.J.’s in-custody confession was involuntary under totality of the circumstances – Jerrell’s “personal characteristics” militate against voluntariness: age (14); school records (average to failing grades) and IQ 84 (low to average); prior experience with law enforcement (limited, but including arrests for minor offenses that,

State v. Ralph D. Armstrong, 2005 WI 119, reversing unpublished decision
For Armstrong: Jerome Buting; Barry Scheck

Issue/Holding: Supreme court has both statutory and inherent authority to order new trial in the interest of justice, even on collateral review (as opposed to direct appeal), ¶¶119-24. (State v. Allen, 159 Wis. 2d 53, 464 N.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1990) (court of appeals has no authority under § 752.35 to engage in no authority to undertake interest-of-justice review on collateral attack) severely questioned if not explicitly overruled.

State v. James M. Moran, 2005 WI 115, reversing unpublished decision
For Moran: Colleen D. Ball, State Bar Pro Bono Project

Issue/Holding:

¶3 We conclude that the plain language of § 974.07(6) gives a movant the right to conduct DNA testing of physical evidence that is in the actual or constructive possession of a government agency and that contains biological material or on which there is biological material,