On Point

State v. Charles Brown, 2004 WI App 179
For Brown: John J. Grau

Issue: Whether a plea bargain that cannot be fulfilled results in an unknowing and involuntary plea, notwithstanding that the terms incapable of fulfillment are collateral consequences of the plea (sex offender registration and SVP eligibility).
Holding:

¶6 … (S)ince Brown’s misunderstanding involved the collateral consequences of his pleas,2 the State contends that Brown cannot prove that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary.

State v. Johnnie Carprue, 2004 WI 111, reversing 2003 WI App 148
For Carprue: Stephanie G. Rapkin

Issue/Holding:

¶39 … (A)ppellate courts are sensitive to judicial intervention by a trial judge in the form of judicial witnesses and judicial questioning ….

¶40 … We have always recognized judicial authority to call and interrogate witnesses but simultaneously admonished caution against judicial abuse.

State v. Victor K. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals

Issue: Whether the State impermissibly cross-examined the defendant about the truthfulness of another witness.

Holding:

¶2. We conclude that the purpose and effect of the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Johnson was to impeach Johnson’s credibility, not to bolster the credibility of another witness, because both Johnson and the other witness were testifying to their personal observations about the same events.

State v. Jimmie R.R., 2004 WI App 168, motion for reconsideration denied 9/15/04
For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A child’s videotaped statement may be admitted under the residual exception, § 908.03(24), without satisfying all the requirements of § 908.08. ¶40. The trial court properly applied the trustworthiness test of State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 245-46,

Stephen Dye v. Frank, 355 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir 2004)
For Dye: Christopher M. Bailey

Issue/Holding:

To determine whether a civil penalty is so punitive that it is should be characterized as criminal punishment, we must consider the factors listed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), and reaffirmed in Hudson v.

State v. Ervin Burris, 2004 WI 91, affirming 2002 WI App 262, 258 Wis. 2d. 454, 654 N.W.2d 866
For Burris: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether, on revocation of supervised release of a sexually violent person, § 980.06(2)(d) (1997-98),  the circuit “court must, for any reason, expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release when the court determines that the safety of others requires revocation,

State v. William L. Morford, 2004 WI 5, on review of unpublished decision
For Morford: Lynn E. Hackbarth

Issue/Holding:

¶7 Reviewing courts generally decline to decide moot issues but may do so under certain circumstances. This court has held that it may decide an otherwise moot issue if it: (1) is of great public importance; (2) occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to guide circuit courts;

State v. Sylvester Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16
For Sigarroa: John Pray, UW Law School
Issue/Holding:

¶28. We do not end our discussion here. Instead, we are compelled to admonish the increasing pattern of witness and/or attorney violation of in limine orders. On several occasions, we have spent judicial time and resources to make a very similar admonition. Unfortunately, it appears our reproach has fallen on deaf ears because the pattern of these violations continues.¶29.

State v. Derryle S. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, PFR granted, affirmed, 2004 WI 70
For McDowell: Christopher J. Cherella
Amici: Keith A. Findley, John T. Savee, John A. Pray, Frank Remington Center & WACDL
Issue/Holding: ¶9 n.4:

We remind counsel and the court of our concerns about off-the-record discussions. See Coston v. Joseph P.

State v. Sherrie S. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, on certification
For Tucker: Paul LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶4. We hold that in accordance with the standard articulated in Britt, if a circuit court restricts any juror information, the court must make an individualized determination that the jury needs protection and take reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effect to the defendant.