On Point

State v. Jimmie R.R., 2004 WI App 168, motion for reconsideration denied 9/15/04
For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: A child’s videotaped statement may be admitted under the residual exception, § 908.03(24), without satisfying all the requirements of § 908.08. ¶40. The trial court properly applied the trustworthiness test of State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 245-46,

Stephen Dye v. Frank, 355 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir 2004)
For Dye: Christopher M. Bailey

Issue/Holding:

To determine whether a civil penalty is so punitive that it is should be characterized as criminal punishment, we must consider the factors listed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), and reaffirmed in Hudson v.

State v. Ervin Burris, 2004 WI 91, affirming 2002 WI App 262, 258 Wis. 2d. 454, 654 N.W.2d 866
For Burris: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether, on revocation of supervised release of a sexually violent person, § 980.06(2)(d) (1997-98),  the circuit “court must, for any reason, expressly consider alternatives to revocation before revoking supervised release when the court determines that the safety of others requires revocation,

State v. William L. Morford, 2004 WI 5, on review of unpublished decision
For Morford: Lynn E. Hackbarth

Issue/Holding:

¶7 Reviewing courts generally decline to decide moot issues but may do so under certain circumstances. This court has held that it may decide an otherwise moot issue if it: (1) is of great public importance; (2) occurs so frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to guide circuit courts;

State v. Sylvester Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16
For Sigarroa: John Pray, UW Law School
Issue/Holding:

¶28. We do not end our discussion here. Instead, we are compelled to admonish the increasing pattern of witness and/or attorney violation of in limine orders. On several occasions, we have spent judicial time and resources to make a very similar admonition. Unfortunately, it appears our reproach has fallen on deaf ears because the pattern of these violations continues.¶29.

State v. Derryle S. McDowell, 2003 WI App 168, PFR granted, affirmed, 2004 WI 70
For McDowell: Christopher J. Cherella
Amici: Keith A. Findley, John T. Savee, John A. Pray, Frank Remington Center & WACDL
Issue/Holding: ¶9 n.4:

We remind counsel and the court of our concerns about off-the-record discussions. See Coston v. Joseph P.

State v. Sherrie S. Tucker, 2003 WI 12, on certification
For Tucker: Paul LaZotte, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶4. We hold that in accordance with the standard articulated in Britt, if a circuit court restricts any juror information, the court must make an individualized determination that the jury needs protection and take reasonable precautions to minimize any prejudicial effect to the defendant.

State v. Nancy R. Lamon, 2003 WI 78, affirming unpublished decision of court of appeals, affirmed on habeas review, Lamon v. Boatwright, 7th Cir No. 05-4018, 11/8/06
For Lamon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: A trial judge is not required to make detailed findings in ruling on a Batson issue, ¶76.

Issue/Holding: That a prospective juror’s last name “is a well-known criminal name” in the locality,

State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell

Issue: In essence, this court is presented with the question of whether a custodial inculpatory statement, obtained without proper Miranda warnings, and extracted through the use of police deception, is an “involuntary” self-incriminatory statement and inadmissible at trial for any purpose,” ¶95. (The police ruse involved inducing Knapp into talking by telling him that they were investigating constitutional violations committed by the department when they were in fact investigating Knapp’s involvement in a homicide.)

Holding: Given Knapp’s intelligence,

State v. Paul D. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, affirming unpublished opinion
For Hoppe: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Both Connelly and Clappes support the proposition that some coercive or improper police conduct must exist in order to sustain a finding of involuntariness. However, both of these cases also recognize that police conduct does not need to be egregious or outrageous in order to be coercive.