On Point

SCOWstats just reviewed 70 Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions over the past 2 years to determine which court of appeals judge was reversed most often and least often.  And the winners are . . . SCOW reversed Judges Dugan, Donald and Kessler (and District 1 in general) most often.  It reversed Judge Davis least often.

Manitowoc County v. J.M.K., 2022AP122, 7/27/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.M.K.  is currently diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. He has been committed several times since 2015. Right now he is doing well. He lives in a supervised apartment but holds a job, participates in community activities, and works out at the YMCA. The county monitors his medication compliance because in the past when he has stopped taking them he deteriorated rapidly.

Brown County v. J.V., 2022AP532, 7/28/22, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In a modified CHIPS dispositional order, the circuit court stated that it was suspending Jennifer’s visitation rights to her son, subject to her completing certain conditions. The court did not orally warn her that her parental rights could be terminated if her visitation rights weren’t reinstated within 1 year. Nor did the written order indicate that her rights could be terminated based on continuing denial of visitation under §§ 48.415(4) and 48.356(2).

State v. Robert Daris Spencer, 2022 WI 56, July 6, 2022, affirming in part and reversing in part an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that Spencer had no right to be personally present or even to have counsel present when the trial judge decided to dismiss a juror for cause just before deliberations began because the judge’s interaction with the juror wasn’t a critical stage of the proceedings. 

Chippewa County Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. J.W.., 2021AP1986, 7/19/22, District  3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

“Janine” raised an insufficient evidence claim and several ineffective assistance of counsel claims in her appeal from an order terminating her parental right to her son.  This post focuses on two of the IAC claims. Counsel failed to object to (1) portions of the county social worker’s testimony, and (2) new information that the GAL introduced during closing statements.

State v. S.G., 2022AP585-587, 7/19/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

S.G. argued that the circuit court failed to address 2 of the 6 “best interest” factors in §48.426(3) when it terminated her parental rights to her 3 sons. According to the court of appeals, the record proves otherwise.

State v. X.S., 2022 WI 49, 6/29/22, modifying and affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2021AP419, case activity (including, for some reason, one brief)

Our supreme court is fond of extolling its role as a “law-developing court.” You’ll search in vain for any law development in this case. Rather than developing the law, the high court exercises its discretion to waive a juvenile into the adult system.

State v. L.T.H., 2022AP56 & 2022AP57, District 1, 7/19/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

L.T.H. challenges the circuit court’s refusal to terminate her grounds trial from that of the father of one of her children, its decision to allow evidence of her own experience with the child welfare system when she was a child, its refusal to allow her to testify at the dispositional hearing, and its decision to terminate her parental rights. The court of appeals rejects all her challenges.

State v. M.B., 2022AP89, District 1, 7/19/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.B. entered a no contest plea to failing to assume parental responsibility and to her daughter being in continuing need of protection or services. During the plea colloquy, the circuit court suggested she had the “same trial rights” at the dispositional phase as at the grounds phase. (¶¶3-4). This, M.B. argues, was a flaw in the colloquy because it misstated the correct statutory standard to be applied at disposition—the best interests of the child—and suggests the state had a burden it doesn’t have; thus, she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. (¶¶11, 13). The court of appeals disagrees.

Rock County Human. Servs. v. A.P., Appeal nos. 2022AP248-249; 7/14/22, District 4; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is one more in a long line of appellate decisions affirming a default finding of grounds for terminating a parent’s rights without a finding that the parent had behaved egregiously as required by Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶71, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828 N.W.2d 198. The difference here is that the court of appeals also openly disregards (or perhaps is unfamiliar with?) the rules of appellate procedure.